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INTRODUCTION
In many of the top death penalty states, the leading cause
of death for prisoners on death row is not lethal injection. Nor
is it the electric chair. It is not even any form of execution. It is
1
death by natural and other causes. From 1973–2011, in four of
the top five states with the largest death row populations in
2011, more death row prisoners died of old age than were exe2
cuted. In California during that period, for every one prisoner
3
executed, six died on death row of other causes. In Pennsylvania during the same period, a death row prisoner was nine
4
times more likely to die from other causes than by execution.
The ballooning number of prisoners spending decades on death
row who will die prior to execution stems from the combined ef† Professor of Law, The University of Tulsa. Thanks to Lyn Entzeroth,
Jeffrey Fagan, George Fletcher, Stephen Galoob, Ken Levy, Brent Newton,
Judge John T. Noonan, Jr., Peter Oh, Tamara Piety, and Eric Reynolds for
their helpful comments. I also thank participants in workshops of a previous
version of this Article at Columbia University School of Law, University of
Tulsa College of Law, and the Law and Society Conference. Copyright © 2014
by Russell L. Christopher.
1. See, e.g., DAVID GARLAND, PECULIAR INSTITUTION: AMERICA’S DEATH
PENALTY IN AN AGE OF ABOLITION 11 (2010) (citing “natural causes” as the
leading cause of death for convicted murderers on death row); Ernest van den
Haag, The Ultimate Punishment: A Defense, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1662, 1662
(1986) (“[M]ost convicts sentenced to death are likely to die of old age.”); David
Von Drehle, When Harry Met Scalia: Why the Death Penalty Is Dying, WASH.
POST, Mar. 6, 1994, at C3 (“What should a man on death row fear most: electrocution, gassing or lethal injection? Try: Old age.”).
2. Aggregating the totals from California, Florida, Pennsylvania, and Alabama, 142 prisoners were executed and 206 died from other causes. See
TRACY L. SNELL, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, 2011 – STATISTICAL TABLES, NCJ242185, 18 tbl.15, 20
tbl.17 (2013) [hereinafter DOJ STATISTICS 2011]. The other state in the top
five is Texas. See id. at 18 tbl.15.
3. See id. at 20 tbl.17.
4. See id.
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fects of the lengthy appeal and review process, intentional de6
7
lay by prisoners, states’ constitutionally defective procedures,
8
and states’ lack of resources. Nationwide, the average tenure
on death row has risen from several weeks in the eighteenth
9
10
11
century, to two years in 1968, to six years in 1984, to ten
12
13
years in 1996, to fourteen years in 2009, and to almost sev14
enteen years in 2011. Recently, one prisoner’s stay on death
15
row reached thirty-nine years. What was once a brief period of
pre-execution confinement followed by a near-certain execution
has now become either “life imprisonment without the possibil16
ity of parole, but with the possibility of death,” or a lengthy
term of incarceration—upwards of thirty years or more—

5. See, e.g., Coleman v. Balkcom, 451 U.S. 949, 957–58 (1981)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (“[T]his Court and the lower federal courts have converted the constitutional limits upon imposition of
the death penalty . . . into arcane niceties which parallel the equity court practices described in Charles Dickens’ ‘Bleak House.’”).
6. See, e.g., Turner v. Jabe, 58 F.3d 924, 933 (4th Cir. 1995) (Luttig, J.,
concurring) (referring to the prisoner’s “interminable efforts of delay”).
7. E.g., Thompson v. McNeil, 556 U.S. 1114, 1116 (2009) (Stevens, J., respecting denial of certiorari) (“[D]elays have multiple causes, including ‘the
States’ failure to apply constitutionally sufficient procedures . . . .’” (quoting
Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 998 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial
of certiorari))).
8. See, e.g., Arthur L. Alarcón, Remedies for California’s Death Row
Deadlock, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 697, 700–01 n.15 (2007) (noting that a death row
prisoner waited almost seventeen years for his automatic appeal to the California Supreme Court); Sara Colón, Comment, Capital Crime: How California’s Administration of the Death Penalty Violates the Eighth Amendment, 97
CALIF. L. REV. 1377, 1391 (2009) (noting a lack of “qualified trial counsel”).
9. E.g., STUART BANNER, THE DEATH PENALTY: AN AMERICAN HISTORY
17 (2002) (noting that the typical period between sentence and execution was
one to several weeks in colonial America).
10. People v. Anderson, 493 P.2d 880, 894 n.37 (Cal. 1972) (en banc) (citing 33.3 months as the national median period of death row incarceration),
superseded by constitutional amendment, CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 27, as recognized in Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48, 90 (Cal. 2009).
11. See DOJ STATISTICS 2011, supra note 2, at 14 tbl.10.
12 . See id.
13. See id.
14. See id.
15. Muhammad v. Florida, No. 13-8030, 13A674, 2014 WL 37226, at *1
(U.S. Jan. 7, 2014) (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). The prisoner, Thomas Knight, received his death sentence in 1975. Knight v. Florida,
528 U.S. 990, 994 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
16. Angela April Sun, Note, “Killing Time” in the Valley of the Shadow of
Death: Why Systematic Preexecution Delays on Death Row Are Cruel and Unusual, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1585, 1614 (2013).
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17

followed by execution. And this problem will only become
18
worse as the length of death row tenures continues to rise.
In principle, delay in the imposition of punishment is not
ideal. Apart from the oft-uttered slogan “justice delayed is jus19
tice denied,” delay diminishes the purposes and undermines
the justifications of punishment. As the influential eighteenth20
century Italian philosopher Cesare Beccaria maintained,
“[t]he more prompt the punishment is and the sooner it follows
the crime, the more just and useful it will be. I say more just,
because it spares the criminal the useless and cruel torments of
21
uncertainty . . . .” Jeremy Bentham, the founder of utilitarianism, contended that the more distant or less proximate the pun22
ishment, the lesser the deterrent effect. And as leading con17. See, e.g., James S. Liebman & Peter Clarke, Minority Practice, Majority’s Burden: The Death Penalty Today, 9 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 255, 319 (2011)
(“[T]he death penalty is not the punishment for murder in the United States;
the penalty instead is life without the possibility of parole, but with a small
chance of execution a decade later.”); Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Entrenchment and/or Destabilization? Reflections on (Another) Two Decades of
Constitutional Regulation of Capital Punishment, 30 LAW & INEQ. 211, 230–31
(2012) (“The death penalty now encompasses two separate punishments:
lengthy incarceration under very severe conditions (essentially solitary confinement in many states), followed by an execution.”).
18. See, e.g., Elizabeth Rapaport, A Modest Proposal: The Aged of Death
Row Should Be Deemed Too Old To Execute, 77 BROOK. L. REV. 1089, 1090
(2012) (“The ranks of the long serving [on death row] are steadily growing.”);
Kara Sharkey, Comment, Delay in Considering the Constitutionality of Inordinate Delay: The Death Row Phenomenon and the Eighth Amendment, 161 U.
PA. L. REV. 861, 864 (2013) (“[T]he length of time prisoners spend on death
row [is] increas[ing].”).
19. 190 PARL. DEB., H.C. (3d ser.) (1868) 1771 (U.K.). The phrase appears
to have been coined by Liberal Party leader and future Prime Minister William Gladstone in a speech to the House of Commons advocating measures
that would relieve Ireland of the obligation to pay tithes to the Anglican
Church. Id.
20. E.g., BANNER, supra note 9, at 91 (characterizing Beccaria’s volume on
punishment, containing his critique of capital punishment, as “one of the most
influential books of the eighteenth century”); Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M.
Steiker, Cost and Capital Punishment: A New Consideration Transforms an
Old Debate, 2010 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 117, 127 (“Beccaria’s essay shaped the general structure of the debate about the death penalty on both sides of the Atlantic in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.”).
21. CESARE BECCARIA, ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS 36 (David Young,
trans., Hackett Publ’g Co. 1986) (1764). Prompt punishment is more effective
by reinforcing the perception that punishment is “the necessary and inevitable
result” of crime. Id.
22. See JEREMY BENTHAM, THE COLLECTED WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM:
AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 173 (J.H.
Burns & H.L.A. Hart, eds., Oxford Univ. Press 1970) (1789) (noting “[t]he deficiency of the punishment in point of proximity”); see also id. at 170 (“Punish-
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temporary capital punishment scholars Carol and Jordan
Steiker concluded, “extending the time between sentence and
execution undercuts two of the most pressing pro-death-penalty
23
arguments: deterrence and retribution.”
In practice, however, with respect to non-capital punishment, delay is generally accepted for two reasons. First, any delay is apt to be de minimis. Second, even if a delay is appreciable, it is remediable. Post-conviction, any detention counts
24
toward fulfilling a sentence of imprisonment. And pre25
conviction, any detention will be credited as time served. Because the nature of the prisoner’s experience during the delay—confinement in a holding cell—is sufficiently similar to the
nature of the prescribed punishment—imprisonment—reducing
the sentence of imprisonment by the length of the delay sup26
plies a remedy.
But neither of these reasons applies to delay in the imposition of capital punishment. First, decades-long delays are not
27
minimal. Second, there is no clearly acceptable remedy. Because of the different nature of death row incarceration (DRI)
and capital punishment, the former cannot be subtracted from
28
the latter. Short of voiding the death sentence, there is no way
to give credit to the prisoner for time served while awaiting execution.

ment must be further increased in point of magnitude, in proportion as it falls
short in point of proximity.” (emphasis omitted)).
23. Steiker & Steiker, supra note 17, at 230.
24. 18 U.S.C. § 3585(a) (2012) (“A sentence to a term of imprisonment
commences on the date the defendant is received in custody awaiting transportation to, or arrives voluntarily to commence service of sentence at, the official detention facility at which the sentence is to be served.”).
25. Id. § 3585(b) (“A defendant shall be given credit toward the service of
a term of imprisonment for any time he has spent in official detention prior to
the date the sentence commences . . . .”).
26. See Adam J. Kolber, Against Proportional Punishment, 66 VAND. L.
REV. 1141, 1147 (2013) (“Federal judges, for example, are required by statute
to give credit for time served, as are many state judges.” (citing § 3585(b) and
numerous state statutes)).
27. E.g., Valle v. Florida, 132 S. Ct. 1, 1 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting from
denial of stay of execution) (noting petitioner’s thirty-three-year tenure on
death row).
28. See 18 U.S.C. § 3585(a)–(b) (limiting credit for time served during detention to punishments involving “a term of imprisonment”).
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Even capital punishment proponents agree that substan29
tial delay between sentence and execution is objectionable.
And they even agree as to the reason—it undermines the purposes of punishment. As Chief Justice Rehnquist observed,
“[t]here can be little doubt that delay in the enforcement of cap30
ital punishment frustrates the purpose of retribution.” Referring to the delay, Ninth Circuit Chief Judge Alex Kozinski and
Sean Gallagher similarly commented that “[w]hatever purposes
the death penalty is said to serve—deterrence, retribution, assuaging the pain suffered by victims’ families—these purposes
31
are not served by the system as it now operates.”
But capital punishment proponents and opponents disagree as to the constitutionality of and remedy for such substantial delay. Their disagreement has crystallized over what has
32
become known as the “Lackey claim.” In 1995, Justice John
Paul Stevens drafted a memorandum regarding the Court’s de33
nial of certiorari in Lackey v. Texas. Regarding petitioner’s argument that execution following his seventeen years of DRI
would violate the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against
“cruel and unusual punishment,” Justice Stevens commented

29. Sullivan v. Wainwright, 464 U.S. 109, 112 (1983) (per curiam) (Burger, C.J., concurring) (“The argument . . . that capital punishment is cruel and
unusual is dwarfed by the cruelty of 10 years on death row . . . .”).
30. Coleman v. Balkcom, 451 U.S. 949, 960 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
31. Alex Kozinski & Sean Gallagher, Death: The Ultimate Run-On Sentence, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1, 4 (1995).
32. E.g., Bryan A. Stevenson, The Politics of Fear and Death: Successive
Problems in Capital Federal Habeas Corpus Cases, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 699, 762
(2002) (“[T]he claim of inordinate delay of execution [is] commonly known as a
‘Lackey claim’ . . . .”). Brent Newton, counsel for the death-row prisoner Clarence Lackey and architect of the “Lackey claim,” explains the claim as follows:
Lackey’s Eighth Amendment claim had two discrete components,
both of which contended that his execution would be a “disproportionate” punishment and, thus, cruel and unusual: first, that the state’s
carrying out the execution after keeping Lackey under the extreme
conditions of death row for such a lengthy period of time would exact
more punishment than the state was entitled to under the Eighth
Amendment; and second, that neither of the state’s primary interests
in capital punishment—retribution and deterrence—would be meaningfully served in Lackey’s case after such a lengthy delay, particularly because it was primarily attributable to the state and not to Lackey.
Brent E. Newton, The Slow Wheels of Furman’s Machinery of Death, 13 J. APP.
PRAC. & PROCESS 41, 54–55 (2012).
33. 514 U.S. 1045 (1995) (Stevens, J., respecting denial of certiorari).
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that Lackey’s claim, “[t]hough novel . . . is not without founda34
tion.”
In several subsequent Lackey claim petitions, Justice Stevens expressed support for the prisoners’ claims, Justice Steven
Breyer dissented from the denials of certiorari, and Justice
35
Clarence Thomas concurred in the denials of certiorari. These
dueling memoranda among the three Justices, spanning nearly
twenty years, comprise a lively debate. Justices Breyer and
Stevens argue that such delay may be unconstitutional on either of two principal grounds. First, it is cruel and unusual
36
punishment. Second, it frustrates the purposes of punish37
38
ment. The remedy is barring execution after such delays.
Justice Thomas finds the delay constitutional because it is due
39
to efforts to ensure that the prisoner receives due process and
prisoners’ exploitation of these procedural requirements to
40
manufacture delay. Because delay extends the life of the prisoner, the prisoner naturally opts for and benefits from the de41
lay. Otherwise, a prisoner is free to craft his own remedy by
42
simply “submitting to . . . execution.”
In addition to the ultimate merit of Lackey claims, the Justices disagree as to their seriousness. Justices Breyer and Ste43
vens find Lackey claims “important” and worthy of the full
34. Id. at 1045.
35. See infra notes 163–67 and accompanying text.
36. E.g., Valle v. Florida, 132 S. Ct. 1, 1 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting from
denial of stay) (“I have little doubt about the cruelty of [thirty-three years] of
incarceration under sentence of death . . . . So long a confinement followed by
execution would also seem unusual.”).
37. E.g., Johnson v. Bredesen, 558 U.S. 1067, 1069 (2009) (Stevens, J.,
joined by Breyer, J., respecting denial of certiorari) (“[T]he penological justifications for the death penalty diminish as the delay lengthens.”).
38. E.g., id. (“[A] successful Lackey claim would have the effect of rendering invalid a particular death sentence . . . .”).
39. See, e.g., Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 991 (1999) (Thomas, J., concurring in denial of certiorari) (“[T]he delay in carrying out the prisoner’s execution stems from this Court’s Byzantine death penalty jurisprudence.”).
40. See, e.g., Thompson v. McNeil, 556 U.S. 1114, 1117 (2009) (Thomas, J.,
concurring in denial of certiorari) (referring to a prisoner’s “litigation strategy,
which delays his execution”).
41. See, e.g., id. (emphasizing that “petitioner chose to challenge his death
sentence”).
42. E.g., Foster v. Florida, 537 U.S. 990, 991 (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring in denial of certiorari) (“Petitioner could long ago have ended [the delay] . . . by submitting to what the people of Florida have deemed him to deserve: execution.”).
43. Lackey v. Texas, 514 U.S. 1045, 1047 (1995) (Stevens, J., respecting
denial of certiorari).
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44

Supreme Court’s attention. Moreover, as Justice Breyer maintains, “[w]here a delay, measured in decades, reflects the
State’s own failure to comply with the Constitution’s demands,
the claim that time has rendered the execution inhuman is a
45
particularly strong one.” In contrast, Justice Thomas derides
46
Justice Breyer’s arguments as “musings” and dismisses Lack47
ey claims as “mak[ing] ‘a mockery of our system of justice.’”
Attempting to break this impasse, this Article undertakes
the first comprehensive assessment of Lackey claims under re48
49
tributivism. With empirical studies either inconclusive, or
affirmatively establishing that capital punishment fails to de50
ter crime beyond noncapital forms of punishment, or even es51
tablishing that capital punishment increases crime, the Su44. See, e.g., Johnson v. Bredesen, 558 U.S. 1067, 1070 (2009) (Stevens, J.,
joined by Breyer, J., respecting denial of certiorari) (“Most regrettably, a majority of this Court continues to find these issues not of sufficient weight to
merit our attention.”).
45. Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 993 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting
from denial of certiorari).
46. Foster, 537 U.S. at 991 (Thomas, J., concurring in denial of certiorari).
47. Thompson v. McNeil, 556 U.S. 1114, 1117 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring in denial of certiorari) (quoting Turner v. Jabe, 58 F.3d 924, 933 (4th Cir.
1995)).
48. For a succinct explanation of retributivism, see John Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, 64 PHIL. REV. 3, 4–5 (1955) (“[T]he retributive view is that punishment is justified on the grounds that wrongdoing merits punishment. It is
morally fitting that a person who does wrong should suffer in proportion to his
wrongdoing.”). For further explication of retributivism, see infra Part I.B.
49. Compare Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Is Capital Punishment
Morally Required? Acts, Omissions, and Life-Life Tradeoffs, 58 STAN. L. REV.
703, 711–13 (2005) (citing studies suggesting a strong deterrent effect from
capital punishment), with John J. Donohue & Justin Wolfers, Uses and Abuses
of Empirical Evidence in the Death Penalty Debate, 58 STAN. L. REV. 791, 794
(2005) (criticizing those same studies as unreliable because of the low incidence of executions relative to the dramatically higher incidence of murder),
and Jeffrey Fagan, Death and Deterrence Redux: Science, Law and Causal
Reasoning on Capital Punishment, 4 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 255, 269–89 (2006)
(criticizing studies purporting to establish capital punishment’s deterrent effect).
50. See, e.g., William C. Bailey & Ruth D. Peterson, Murder, Capital Punishment, and Deterrence: A Review of the Literature, in THE DEATH PENALTY
IN AMERICA 135, 155 (Hugo Adam Bedau ed., 1997) (“The available evidence
[including a review of sixty articles] remains ‘clear and abundant’ that, as
practiced in the United States, capital punishment is not more effective than
imprisonment in deterring murder.”).
51. See, e.g., Joanna M. Shepherd, Deterrence Versus Brutalization: Capital Punishment’s Differing Impacts Among States, 104 MICH. L. REV. 203, 240
(2005) (noting studies suggesting capital punishment increases the murder
rate through a “brutalization effect”).
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preme Court enshrines retributivism as the “primary justifica52
tion for the death penalty.” Despite retributivism’s central
role in justifying capital punishment per se, neither case law
nor scholarly commentary includes a thorough analysis of the
justifiability of the combination of substantial DRI plus capital
punishment (the Combination) under retributivism. Capital
punishment opponents largely assert, without demonstrating,
that the Combination fails to further retributivism. And they
largely assume, without questioning, that DRI constitutes
criminal punishment (rather than a civil sanction). Because its
legal status is unclear, this Article presents and supports five
different possible conceptions of DRI. Applying retributivism to
each of these conceptions, this Article demonstrates that substantially delayed capital punishment violates retributivism.
In order to find common ground, this Article’s argument
adopts many of the premises and contentions of capital punishment proponents. First, the argument assesses the Combination under the theory of punishment—retributivism—that
proponents find most persuasive and ignores a deterrencebased punishment theory that is more favorable to capital pun53
ishment opponents. Second, it concedes retributivism’s justification of capital punishment per se. Third, the argument does
not make the legally unsubstantiated assumption that DRI is
necessarily “punishment.” And finally, it concedes the possibility that DRI may even be a benefit to the prisoner; by delaying
death, the prisoner’s life is extended. As such, DRI may be a
mitigation of the capital punishment.

52. Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 461 (1984); accord Baze v. Rees, 553
U.S. 35, 79–80 (2008) (Stevens, J., concurring) (“[R]etribution [is] the primary
rationale for imposing the death penalty.”); Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 614
(2002) (Breyer, J., concurring) (“[R]etribution provides the main justification
for capital punishment . . . .”); Harris v. Alabama, 513 U.S. 504, 518 (1995)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[T]he interest that we have identified as the principal justification for the death penalty is retribution . . . .”).
53. See Rapaport, supra note 18, at 1121 (“[Regarding Lackey claims], retribution is to the fore and deterrence recedes in that the plausibility of additional deterrent value in execution after decades of incarceration . . . is difficult to defend. The Court’s Lackey debates therefore turn on whether decadesplus-death is excessive retribution offensive to the Eighth Amendment.”).
Rapaport observes that “Justice Thomas apparently concedes as much in noting that Justice Breyer’s criticism of execution after long delay for lack of additional deterrent effect would be remedied by reverting to something like our
earlier and sprightlier system [when delays between sentencing and execution
were only a matter of weeks and months.]” Id. at 1121 n.160 (citing Knight v.
Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 990 n.1 (1999)).
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From the very premise that retributivism justifies capital
punishment per se, this Article demonstrates that the Combination is unjustified under retributivism. And it is unjustified
regardless of whether DRI constitutes additional punishment
aggravating capital punishment or a life-extending, beneficial
mitigation of capital punishment. And by being unjustified under retributivism, the Combination loses the primary support
for its constitutionality.
This Article unfolds in the following parts. After Part I
provides a brief introduction to the constitutionality of capital
punishment, the principles of retributivism, and retributivism’s
application to capital punishment, Part II provides an overview
of the issue of substantial DRI. It first sketches a history of the
issue prior to Lackey. Next, Part II summarizes the debate over
the Lackey claim. It presents eight principal arguments as to
the unconstitutionality of the Combination and ten principal
arguments supporting its constitutionality.
Part III demonstrates how the Combination violates retributivism. Because the status of substantial DRI is unclear, it
presents five possible approaches: (i) additional punishment, (ii) a lessening or mitigation of the capital punishment, (iii) either additional punishment or a mitigation, (iv) both additional punishment and a mitigation,
and (v) legally and retributively nothing. Despite accepting as a
premise that retributivism justifies capital punishment per se,
this Part demonstrates that under each of the first four approaches, the Combination is undeserved, disproportional, and
unjustified under retributivism. Only under the fifth approach—that upwards of thirty years or more of DRI is legally
and retributively nothing—is the Combination possibly justified. But this approach yields an absurdity. When death row
incarceration culminates in death by old age or nonexecution
causes, blameworthy perpetrators of heinous murders would
receive no punishment whatsoever (by construing DRI as nothing) despite being in state custody upwards of thirty years or
more after sentencing. To avoid this absurdity, substantial DRI
must constitute additional punishment. But this only brings us
back full circle. As additional punishment, the Combination is
unjustified. The resulting dilemma is that either substantial
DRI culminating in death by execution is unjustified under retributivism or such incarceration culminating in death by old
age entails the absurdity of blameworthy, convicted capital offenders receiving no punishment. After considering several
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possible resolutions to the dilemma, this Part argues that converting death sentences to life imprisonment sentences is the
preferable resolution. Finally, this Part anticipates and rebuts
three possible objections. With retributivism enthroned as the
primary justification for the constitutionality of capital punishment, and the Combination violating retributivism, this Article concludes that the Combination may be unconstitutional.
I. RETRIBUTIVISM AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
Before applying retributivism to the Combination, some
background on capital punishment and retributivism may be
helpful. This Part supplies a brief introduction to the constitutionality of capital punishment, the principles of retributivism,
and retributivism’s specific application to capital punishment.
A. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
The modern era of death penalty jurisprudence in the
United States perhaps begins with the Supreme Court’s invali54
dation of capital punishment in 1972, in Furman v. Georgia.
The disparate opinions of the justices in the majority coalesced
into two common themes. First, the imposition of the defend55
ants’ death penalties was arbitrary and capricious. Second,
the challenged death penalties failed to further the goals and
purposes of acceptable theories of punishment—retribution and
deterrence. As Justice Brennan explained, “[i]f there is a significantly less severe punishment adequate to achieve the purposes for which the punishment is inflicted . . . the punishment in56
flicted is unnecessary and therefore excessive.” And as Justice
White declared, capital punishment that fails to further the
purposes of deterrence and retribution “would then be the
pointless and needless extinction of human life with only marginal contributions to any discernible social or public purposes.
A penalty with such negligible returns to the State would be
patently excessive and cruel and unusual punishment violative
57
of the Eighth Amendment.”
In the next landmark case, Gregg v. Georgia, the Court upheld capital punishment as per se constitutional, and a plurality enunciated a two-part framework for assessing capital pun54. See generally 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
55. See id. at 256–57 (Douglas, J., concurring), 309–10 (Stewart, J., concurring).
56. Id. at 279 (Brennan, J., concurring).
57. Id. at 312 (White, J., concurring).
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58

ishment’s constitutionality. First, capital punishment must be
found not only historically acceptable at the time of the Eighth
Amendment’s adoption in 1791, but also acceptable under “‘the
evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a ma59
turing society’”—acceptable to contemporary society. Citing
60
the literal text of the Constitution and the prevalence of capital punishment in every state at the time of ratification of the
61
Eighth Amendment, the Court found it historically acceptable.
Referencing the thirty-five state legislatures’ reenacting death
62
penalty statutes and the numerous jury decisions imposing
63
death in the wake of Furman, the Court found it presently acceptable.
Second, capital punishment must also satisfy human digni64
ty. In addition to torture and other “barbarous” modes of exe65
66
cution that are “cruelly inhumane,” the principle of human
67
dignity bars excessive punishments. One type of excessive
68
punishment is an unnecessary punishment. Punishment failing to further acceptable goals of punishment—retribution and
69
deterrence—is unnecessary. Such punishment constitutes “the
70
gratuitous infliction of suffering” and “the unnecessary and
71
wanton infliction of pain.” Although skeptical of the deterrent
58. See 428 U.S. 153, 169–87 (1976).
59. Id. at 173 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)).
60. See id. at 177 (“It is apparent from the text of the Constitution itself
that the existence of capital punishment was accepted by the Framers.”). The
Court noted that the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments “contemplated” capital punishment by imposing restrictions on its imposition. Id.
61. See id. (“At the time the Eighth Amendment was ratified, capital punishment was a common sanction in every State.”).
62. See id. at 179–80.
63. Id. at 182 (“At the close of 1974 at least 254 persons had been sentenced to death since Furman.”).
64. See id. at 173 (explaining that capital punishment “must accord with
‘the dignity of man,’ which is the ‘basic concept underlying the Eighth
Amendment’” (quoting Trop, 356 U.S. at 100)).
65. Id. at 170–71 (internal quotation marks omitted).
66. Id. at 175.
67. Id. at 173 (stating that punishment consistent with human dignity
“means, at least, that the punishment not be ‘excessive’”).
68. See id.
69. See id. at 183.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 173; accord Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 319 (2002) (stating
that such punishment would be “‘nothing more than the purposeless and needless imposition of pain and suffering’ and [thus] unconstitutional” (quoting
Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 798 (1982)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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72

value, the Court deferred to the findings of state legislatures
73
that capital punishment promoted deterrence. More confident
of capital punishment’s furtherance of retribution, the Court
found that giving the capital offender what he deserved served
to express and channel “society’s moral outrage” at the crime
74
and forestall vigilantism. Another type of excessive punish75
ment is disproportional punishment. Unable to declare “[capital] punishment is invariably disproportionate to the crime [of
murder],” the Court held that capital punishment is not per se
unconstitutional because it is neither unacceptable under
76
evolving standards of decency nor violative of human dignity.
Although Gregg held that “the death penalty is not invariably unconstitutional . . . the Court insists upon confining the
instances in which the punishment can be imposed” to a very
77
limited class of offenders and offenses. Since Gregg, most constitutional challenges to capital punishment center on claims of
78
disproportionality. Stating that the Eighth Amendment bars
79
excessive as well as cruel and unusual punishments, the
Court explained that this protection “flows from the basic ‘precept of justice that punishment for [a] crime should be graduat72. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 185 (noting that statistical studies as to the deterrent value of capital punishment over that of life imprisonment “simply
have been inconclusive”).
73. See id. at 186 (“The value of capital punishment as a deterrent of
crime is a complex factual issue the resolution of which properly rests with the
legislatures.”).
74. Id. at 183–84.
75. See id. at 173 (assessing proportionality between the punishment and
“the severity of the crime”); id. at 187 (assessing proportionality of capital punishment “in relation to the crime for which it is imposed”).
76 . Id. at 187. Interestingly, as of 2008, there are now five Gregg Justices—Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, Powell, and Stevens—who have declared
that capital punishment violates the Eighth Amendment. See Elisabeth
Semel, Reflections on Justice John Paul Stevens’s Concurring Opinion in Baze
v. Rees: A Fifth Gregg Justice Renounces Capital Punishment, 43 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 783, 791 (2010).
77. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 420 (2008) (citation omitted).
78. See LINDA E. CARTER ET AL., UNDERSTANDING CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
LAW 32 (3d ed. 2012).
79. The Court’s distinction between excessive versus cruel and unusual
punishments is susceptible to confusion. According to the Court, all excessive
punishments necessarily violate the cruel and unusual punishments clause of
the Eighth Amendment and are thus unconstitutional. But not all cruel and
unusual punishments are excessive punishments. See Kennedy, 554 U.S. at
419 (“The [Eighth] Amendment proscribes ‘all excessive punishments, as well
as cruel and unusual punishments that may or may not be excessive.’” (quoting Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311 n.7 (2002))).
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80

ed and proportioned to [the] offense.’” Determining the satisfaction of this “proportionality precept,” or “[p]roportionality
81
review,” requires assessment of capital punishment under
“[e]volving standards of decency [that] must . . . express respect
82
for the dignity of the person.” Decency entails “restraint and
83
moderation in use of capital punishment;” “use of the death
penalty [must] be restrained . . . and limited in its instances of
84
application.” Informing that proportionality review is both an
85
objective and subjective analysis. First, the Court considers
86
“‘objective indicia of society’s standards,’” primarily state
87
statutes and jury sentencing decisions. Second, in the comparatively more subjective portion of the analysis, the Court
applies its own independent evaluation and understanding of
the Eighth Amendment to determine “[w]hether the death pen88
alty is disproportionate to the crime committed” or for a class
89
of offender. Capital punishment is unconstitutionally disproportional or excessive if it either (i) is disproportional to the
crime committed or (ii) fails to promote the legitimate goals and
90
purposes of punishment—retribution and deterrence. As to
the second ground, capital punishment must promote the
penological goals to a degree that is “significant” or “measura-

80. Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 419 (quoting Weems v. United States, 217 U.S.
349, 367 (1910)). For similar language see Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551,
560 (2005); Atkins, 536 U.S. at 311.
81. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 311–12.
82. Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 420.
83. Id. at 436.
84. Id. at 446–47.
85. See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 613 (1977) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (dividing the Court’s analysis into its “objective” and “subjective” components).
86. Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 421 (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551,
563 (2005)).
87. See, e.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 (2002) (noting both that
sixteen states had recently passed legislation prohibiting capital punishment
for the mentally retarded and that there were few such executions in states
still allowing it, the Court concluded that a “national consensus” had emerged
and held executions of such persons to be unconstitutional).
88. Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 421.
89. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 564 (“We then must determine, in the exercise
of our own independent judgment, whether the death penalty is a disproportionate punishment for juveniles.”).
90. See, e.g., Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 441; Roper, 543 U.S. at 571–72; Atkins,
536 U.S. at 318–21.
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91

ble.” But “‘[a] punishment might fail the test on either
92
ground.’”
In some cases the Court ruled capital punishment unconstitutional by primarily relying on the first ground of disproportionality. In 1977, in Coker v. Georgia, the Court held that
capital punishment was unconstitutionally disproportional for
the crime of rape without analyzing whether it furthered goals
93
of punishment. And, in 2008, the Court in Kennedy v. Louisiana held that capital punishment for the crime of rape of a
child is unconstitutionally disproportional despite being unable
94
to rule out that it serves penological goals.
In other cases, the Court relied on the second ground of
failure to further penological goals. For example, in 2002, the
Court in Atkins v. Georgia found capital punishment of the
mentally retarded to be unconstitutionally disproportionate
based on the two prongs of a national and international consensus opposing it, and its failure to further accepted penological
95
goals. Conceptualizing retribution as “the interest in seeing
that the offender gets his ‘just deserts,’” the Court reasoned
that capital punishment was undeserved given the lesser cul96
pability of the mentally retarded. Similarly, in Roper v. Simmons, in 2005, the Court ruled that execution of juvenile offenders was unconstitutional as disproportionate based on the
97
same two prongs. Finding that execution of juveniles failed to
91. Roper, 543 U.S. at 571; accord Atkins, 536 U.S. at 313 (using the
standard of “‘measurably contribut[ing] to the retributive end’” of punishment
(quoting Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 801 (1982))); Coker v. Georgia, 433
U.S. 584, 593 n.4 (1977) (referring to a standard of “measurably serv[ing] the
legitimate ends of punishment”).
92. Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 441 (quoting Coker, 433 U.S. at 593 n.4). To clarify, a punishment may fail the test on either ground because a punishment
may be unconstitutionally disproportional even if it furthers legitimate goals
of punishment. See Coker, 433 U.S. at 592–93 n.4 (“Because the death sentence is a disproportionate punishment for rape, it is cruel and unusual punishment within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment even though it may
measurably serve the legitimate ends of punishment.”).
93. See 433 U.S. at 592. The Court explained that “[b]ecause the death
sentence is a disproportionate punishment for rape, it is cruel and unusual
punishment within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment even though it may
measurably serve the legitimate ends of punishment.” Id. at 592–93 n.4.
94. See 554 U.S. at 446. The Court conceded that “[a]s in Coker, here it
cannot be said with any certainty that the death penalty for child rape serves
no deterrent or retributive function.” Id. at 441.
95. See 536 U.S. at 321.
96. Id. at 319.
97. See 543 U.S. 551, 575 (2005).
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further retributivism, the Court characterized the retributivist
goal as either “an attempt to express the community’s moral
outrage or as an attempt to right the balance for the wrong to
98
the victim.”
B. RETRIBUTIVISM
Whereas consequentialism justifies punishment by the
good consequences generated by punishment—deterrence, rehabilitation, incapacitation—the good consequences of punishment are irrelevant to retributivism’s justification of punish99
ment. Under retributivism, an offender’s desert is the
necessary and sufficient condition for justified punishment: (i)
only those who deserve punishment may be punished; (ii) all
those who deserve punishment must be punished; and (iii)
those who deserve punishment must be punished neither less
100
than nor more than what they deserve. Because the justifiability of the Combination implicates only the second and third
principles, these will be our focus.
Retributivism imposes a duty to punish all culpable
101
wrongdoers. As Immanuel Kant, perhaps the father of retrib102
utivism, famously declared, “[t]he principle of punishment is
103
a categorical imperative.” While some contemporary retributivist accounts view punishment of offenders as merely permis-

98. Id. at 571.
99. See, e.g., Gertrude Ezorsky, The Ethics of Punishment, in PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES ON PUNISHMENT xi, xi (Gertrude Ezorsky ed., 1972) (explaining that unlike under a consequentialist or utilitarian view, retributivism’s justification of punishment is “irrespective of any further good
consequence, e.g., crime prevention”).
100. See, e.g., MICHAEL MOORE, PLACING BLAME 91 (1997) (“Retributivism
. . . justifie[s] . . . punish[ment] because and only because offenders deserve it.
Moral responsibility (‘desert’) in such a view is not only necessary for justified
punishment, it is also sufficient. . . . [T]he moral responsibility of an offender
also gives society the duty to punish.”); Stephen P. Garvey, Is It Wrong To
Commute Death Row? Retribution, Atonement, and Mercy, 82 N.C. L. REV.
1319, 1324 (2004) (noting that retributivism “obligates the state to punish an
offender because and to the extent, but only to the extent, he deserves to be
punished”).
101. E.g., IGOR PRIMORATZ, JUSTIFYING LEGAL PUNISHMENT 12 (1989)
(identifying “[t]he moral duty to punish” as one of retributivism’s central principles).
102. See, e.g., George P. Fletcher, Law and Morality: A Kantian Perspective, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 533, 533–34 (1987).
103. IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 141 (Mary Gregor ed.
& trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1991) (1797).
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105

106

the “dominant”
and “standard retributive view”
sible,
finds punishment of wrongdoers to be obligatory. As Michael
107
Moore, the leading modern retributivist, stated, “the retributivist regards the punishment of the guilty to be categorically
108
imperative.”
The formula for determining the amount or degree of an offender’s deserved punishment has evolved over time. Echoing
109
the biblical lex talionis of “eye for eye, tooth for tooth,” Kant
110
propounded the “principle of retribution, of like for like”:
[W]hatever undeserved evil you inflict upon another . . . you inflict
upon yourself. If you insult him, you insult yourself; if you steal from
him, you steal from yourself; if you strike him, you strike yourself; if
you kill him, you kill yourself. But only the law of retribution (ius
talionis) . . . can specify definitely the quality and the quantity of pun111
ishment.
112

Under this “principle of equality,” the deserved punishment
113
for a crime is whatever the criminal did to his victim. Punishment takes the form of the crime reciprocated back onto the
criminal. Retributive punishment is “the crime turned round
114
against itself.” For example, a murderer must be executed, a
thief dispossessed of his belongings, etc. Rather than the specific equality espoused by Kant, G.W.F. Hegel, one of the two

104. See, e.g., H. J. McCloskey, A Non-Utilitarian Approach to Punishment,
8 INQUIRY 249 (1965), reprinted in PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES ON PUNISHMENT, supra note 99, at 119, 132.
105. PRIMORATZ, supra note 101, at 110. Though the “duty to punish” may
be sensitive to “facts calling for mercy,” it is still “paramount.” Id.
106. Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARV.
L. REV. 961, 1229 n.660 (2001).
107. See Douglas N. Husak, Retribution in Criminal Theory, 37 SAN DIEGO
L. REV. 959, 960 (2000) (“No contemporary criminal theorist rivals Moore in
his unqualified enthusiasm for retribution.”); Mary Sigler, Contradiction, Coherence, and Guided Discretion in the Supreme Court’s Capital Sentencing Jurisprudence, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1151, 1185 (2003) (“Moore has offered one of
the most sustained and thorough explications of retributivism.”).
108. MOORE, supra note 100, at 156.
109. Exodus 21:23–25 (“Wherever hurt is done, you shall give life for life,
eye for eye, tooth for tooth, hand for hand, foot for foot, burn for burn, bruise
for bruise, wound for wound.”).
110. KANT, supra note 103, at 141.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. G.W.F. HEGEL, ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT § 101 at 127
(Allen W. Wood ed., H. B. Nisbet trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1991) (1821)
(explaining that by punishment, “what the criminal has done should also happen to him”).
114. Id. at 129.

CHRISTOPHER_5fmt

2014]

11/30/2014 2:28 PM

DEATH DELAYED

437
115

leading traditional retributivists along with Kant, argued
that the crime and punishment must merely be generally
116
equal. From this general equality, the modern view evolved
that the amount or degree of deserved punishment must corre117
118
spond with, “fit,” or be proportional to the degree of gravity
119
of the crime and the blameworthiness of the offender. As
H.L.A. Hart explained, “modern retributive theory is concerned
120
with proportionality.” Antony Duff noted that the principle of
121
proportionality is “intrinsic to any version of retributivism.”
As the Supreme Court put it, “[p]roportionality is inherently a
122
retributive concept.” And “[t]he concept of proportionality is
central to the Eighth Amendment . . . [and encompasses] the
‘precept of justice that punishment for crime should be gradu123
ated and proportioned to [the] offense.’”
115. E.g., PRIMORATZ, supra note 101, at 13 (“The most important and influential among classical retributivists are Kant and Hegel.”).
116. Hegel required that a punishment be comparable in character or value
to the crime:
[E]quality remains merely the basic measure of the criminal’s essential deserts, but not of the specific external shape which the retribution should take. It is only in terms of this specific shape that theft
and robbery [on the one hand] and fines and imprisonment etc. [on
the other] are completely unequal, whereas in terms of their value,
i.e. their universal character as injuries . . . they are comparable.
HEGEL, supra note 113, § 101 at 129.
117. See, e.g., Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 149 (1987) (“The heart of the
retribution rationale is that a criminal sentence must be directly related to the
personal culpability of the offender.”).
118. Stanley I. Benn, Punishment, in 7 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 29, 32 (Paul Edwards ed., 1972); accord Joel Feinberg, Punishment, in
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 514, 516 (Joel Feinberg & Hyman Gross eds., 2d ed.
1980) (“The proper amount of punishment to be inflicted upon the morally
guilty offender is that amount which fits, matches or is proportionate to the
moral gravity of the offense.”).
119. E.g., PRIMORATZ, supra note 101, at 12 (“Punishment ought to be proportionate to the offense (the lex talionis).”); Kent Greenawalt, Punishment, 74
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 343, 347–48 (1983) (“[T]he severity of punishment
should be proportional to the degree of wrongdoing . . . .”); Rawls, supra note
48, at 4–5 (explaining that an offender should be punished “in proportion to
his wrongdoing”).
120. H. L. A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 234 (1968).
121. R. A. DUFF, PUNISHMENT, COMMUNICATION, AND COMMUNITY 132
(2001).
122. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 989 (1991); accord Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 31 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“Proportionality—the
notion that the punishment should fit the crime—is inherently a concept tied
to the penological goal of retribution.”).
123. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2021 (2010) (quoting Weems v.
United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367 (1910)).
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Disproportional punishment may be either too much or too
124
little. Referring to punishments that are “either too much, or
too little,” Igor Primoratz concluded that they are “in both cases
disproportionate, and thus unjust and wrong, from the stand125
point of retributive theory.” Norval Morris and Michael Tonry
noted that “[a] thoroughgoing retributivist would claim that the
punishment to be imposed on an offender should be exactly ‘as
126
much as he deserves, no more, no less.’” Richard Frase stated
that under a retributivist just desert theory, “all offenders
127
should receive their particular deserts—no more and no less.”
Jean Hampton explained that too little punishment may be
even worse than too much: “From a retributive point of view,
punishments that are too lenient are as bad as (and sometimes
128
worse than) punishments that are too severe.” As a result,
punishments that are either too severe or too lenient are disproportional, undeserved, and unjustified under retributiv129
ism.
124. See, e.g., HEGEL, supra note 113, § 214 at 245 (“[A]n injustice is done if
there is even one lash too many, or one dollar or groschen, one week or one day
in prison too many or too few.”).
125. PRIMORATZ, supra note 101, at 162.
126. NORVAL MORRIS & MICHAEL TONRY, BETWEEN PRISON AND PROBATION 84 (1990).
127. Richard S. Frase, Punishment Purposes, 58 STAN. L. REV. 67, 76
(2005).
128. Jean Hampton, Correcting Harms Versus Righting Wrongs: The Goal
of Retribution, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1659, 1691 (1991). Dan Markel explains the
wrong of disproportional leniency: “If the state . . . fail[s] to mete out punishment that is commensurate with the severity of the crime, [it] lends plausibility to the offender’s claim of superiority over society and his victim. Punishing
insufficiently . . . aid[s] the offender’s claim of superiority . . . .” Dan Markel,
State, Be Not Proud: A Retributivist Defense of the Commutation of Death Row
and the Abolition of the Death Penalty, 40 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 407, 446
(2005).
129. Under one variant of retributivism, punishments equal to or less than
what is deserved and proportional are permissible. Variously called “negative
retributivism,” J. L. Mackie, Morality and the Retributive Emotions, 1 CRIM.
JUST. ETHICS 3, 4 (1982), or “weakened versions” of retributivism, HART, supra note 120, at 233, the only limitation imposed on the amount of punishment is a ceiling but not a floor. For example, if an offender deserves ten years’
imprisonment, any punishment equal to or less than ten years’ imprisonment
satisfies negative retributivism. Even zero punishment satisfies negative retributivism. For this reason, negative retributivism is not considered a justification of punishment—it fails to provide an affirmative reason to punish any
offender with any punishment. E.g., R. A. Duff, Penal Communications: Recent
Work in the Philosophy of Punishment, 20 CRIME & JUST. 1, 7 (1996) (“[Negative retributivism] clearly provides no complete justification . . . for it tells us
that we may punish the guilty (their punishment is not unjust), but not that or
why we should punish them.”). As a result, retributivism is generally under-
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C. RETRIBUTIVISM’S JUSTIFICATION OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
Both Kant and Hegel insisted that retributivism demands
capital punishment for murder. While allowing some depar130
tures from specific equality between crime and punishment,
Kant maintained that “every murderer . . . must suffer
131
death.” As Kant declared, “If, however, he has committed
murder he must die. Here there is no substitute that will satisfy justice. There is no similarity between life . . . and death,
hence no likeness between the crime and the retribution unless
132
death is judicially carried out upon the wrongdoer.” Despite
realizing that “retribution cannot aim to achieve specific equality” between crime and punishment, Hegel acknowledged “this
is not the case with murder, which necessarily incurs the death
133
penalty.” The measure of general equivalence cannot determine the deserved punishment for murder “since none is equiv134
alent to life—but only in the taking of another life.”
Contemporary courts and commentators widely view retributivism as supplying a justification, and the most compel135
ling justification, of capital punishment. As Carol and Jordan
stood to not mean negative retributivism. E.g., Michael S. Moore, Punishment,
in THE CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY 759, 759 (Robert Audi ed., 2d
ed. 1999) (“Retributivism is also not the view (sometimes called ‘weak’ or ‘negative’ retributivism) that only the deserving are to be punished, for desert on
such a view typically operates only as a limiting and not as a justifying condition of punishment.”).
130. See KANT, supra note 103, at 141–42 (citing as an example, the deserved punishment of a wealthy thief might differ from that of a poor thief).
131. Id. at 143; accord id. at 145 (“The categorical imperative of penal justice remains (unlawful killing of another must be punished by death).”).
132. Id. at 142.
133. HEGEL, supra note 113, § 101 at 129.
134. Id. at 129–30.
135. E.g., JOHN PAUL STEVENS, SIX AMENDMENTS: HOW AND WHY WE
SHOULD CHANGE THE CONSTITUTION 110 (2014) (“The real justification for
preserving capital punishment surely rests on the interest in retribution.
[It] . . . provides an explanation for preserving capital punishment that is both
more realistic and more acceptable than any other. . . . [W]hether we should
retain the death penalty depends on the strength of the interest in retribution. . . .”); van den Haag, supra note 1, at 1669 (stating that capital punishment is “the only fitting retribution for murder I can think of”); Markel, supra
note 128, at 423 (“[C]ourts and commentators commonly justify the death penalty in the language of retributive justice.”); Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M.
Steiker, Abolition in Our Time, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 323, 335 (2003) (“The
central justification for the death penalty in the modern era has been retribution.”); Daniel R. Williams, Mitigation and the Capital Defendant Who Wants
To Die: A Study in the Rhetoric of Autonomy and the Hidden Discourse of Collective Responsibility, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 693, 719 n.91 (2006) (“[Retribution] is
the paramount theory undergirding the constitutional legitimation of capital
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Steiker
characterized
the
conventional
argument,
“[r]etributivism’s insistence on proportional punishment as a
matter of the offender’s ‘just deserts’ offers powerful support to
death penalty proponents, who maintain that only death is a
136
proportional punishment for at least some heinous murders.”
Not all, however, believe that retributivism successfully justi137
fies capital punishment. Even some retributivists oppose the
138
death penalty. And perhaps most contemporary retributivists
conclude that retributivism does not require capital punish139
ment.
II. SUBSTANTIAL DEATH ROW INCARCERATION
This Part first sketches a brief overview of the issue of DRI
and significantly delayed capital punishment. Next, it surveys
the principal arguments both for and against the constitutionality of the Combination.
A. OVERVIEW
While the issue of delay between sentencing and execution—referred to as the “death row phenomenon” in foreign
140
courts —rose to its current prominence in 1995 in Lackey v.
punishment, insofar as retribution as a punishment theory is rooted in Kantian notions of respect for persons. Personal culpability, not deterrence, repeatedly surfaces as the most important consideration in capital decisionmaking.”
(citing Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 502 (1987); Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S.
137, 149 (1987); Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 406 (1986) (White, J., dissenting); Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 461–62 (1984); Enmund v. Florida,
458 U.S. 782, 798–801 (1982)).
136. Steiker & Steiker, supra note 20, at 152.
137. See, e.g., Claire Finkelstein, A Contractarian Argument Against the
Death Penalty, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1283, 1307 (2006) (“If the retributivist thinks
torturing a torturer is unjustified, then it is always possible that killing a
murderer is also unjustified.”); Carol S. Steiker, No, Capital Punishment Is
Not Morally Required: Deterrence, Deontology, and the Death Penalty, 58
STAN. L. REV. 751, 769 (2005) (arguing that retributivism fails to justify capital punishment on a number of grounds, including execution of the innocent).
138. See, e.g., Markel, supra note 127, at 458–68 (finding capital punishment’s arbitrariness and offensiveness to human dignity incompatible with
retributivism); David McCord, Imagining a Retributivist Alternative to Capital
Punishment, 50 FLA. L. REV. 1, 6, 11–15 (1998) (opposing capital punishment
on numerous grounds including prolonged DRI undermining retributivism).
139. See infra notes 302–03 and accompanying text.
140. David A. Sadoff, International Law and the Moral Precipice: A Legal
Policy Critique of the Death Row Phenomenon, 17 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 77,
93 n.106 (2008) (explaining that unlike a death row phenomenon claim, a
Lackey claim “dispenses with any consideration of detention conditions or personal circumstances such as youth or mental infirmity, and focuses exclusively
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142

Texas, it has long been recognized. The Supreme Court
perhaps first addressed the issue, albeit in dicta, in the 1890
143
case In re Medley. The Court opined that for a prisoner on
death row, “one of the most horrible feelings to which he can be
subjected during that time is the uncertainty during the whole
of it . . . . [The] immense mental anxiety amount[ed] to a great
144
increase of the offender’s punishment.” What was the period
of DRI that constituted additional punishment increasing the
145
prisoner’s capital punishment? Four weeks.
Beginning in 1960, courts began to squarely address the issue. In Chessman v. Dickson, the Ninth Circuit, refusing to “offer life (under a death sentence) as a prize for one who can stall
the processes for a given number of years,” upheld a twelve146
year delay as constitutional. The California Supreme Court,
however, in People v. Anderson in 1972, held that capital punishment violated the state constitution that prohibited cruel or
unusual punishment, in part based on lengthy DRI: “The cruelty of capital punishment [also] lies . . . in the dehumanizing ef147
fects of the lengthy imprisonment prior to execution . . . .”
Eight years later, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
also based, in part, its ruling that capital punishment was unconstitutionally cruel on the delay between sentence and execu148
tion. The court explained that “‘mental pain is an inseparable
on the duration of death row confinement and its adverse psychological impact”).
141. 514 U.S. 1045 (Stevens, J., respecting denial of certiorari).
142. E.g., McKenzie v. Day, 57 F.3d 1461, 1465 (9th Cir. 1995) (“While Justice Stevens’ memorandum in Lackey has given prominence to the argument
that delay in carrying out a death sentence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment, the legal theory underlying the claim is not new.”).
143. 134 U.S. 160 (1890).
144. Id. at 172.
145. Id.
146. 275 F.2d 604, 607 (9th Cir. 1960).
147. 493 P.2d 880, 894 (Cal. 1972). Later that year, however, California
voters approved Proposition 17 to amend the state constitution such that capital punishment was neither cruel nor unusual punishment. E.g., Carol S.
Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, A Tale of Two Nations: Implementation of the
Death Penalty in “Executing” Versus “Symbolic” States in the United States, 84
TEX. L. REV. 1869, 1899 (2006).
148. Dist. Attorney for Suffolk Dist. v. Watson, 411 N.E.2d 1274, 1283
(Mass. 1980), superseded by constitutional amendment, MASS. CONST. art.
CXVI (holding that “the death penalty, with its full panoply of concomitant
physical and mental tortures, is impermissibly cruel under art. 26 [of the Declaration of Rights of the Massachusetts Constitution] when judged by contemporary standards of decency”). Passed in 1982 by referendum, Amendment 116
amends article 26 of the Declaration of Rights to explicitly provide that the
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part of our practice of punishing criminals by death, for the
prospect of pending execution exacts a frightful toll during the
inevitable long wait between the imposition of sentence and the
149
actual infliction of death.’” But in 1992 the Ninth Circuit
again rejected a claim that delayed execution—this time for
150
sixteen years—constituted cruel and unusual punishment.
And just a few years before Lackey, British Commonwealth and
international human rights courts found substantial DRI to be
151
“inhuman” and “degrading.”
In 1995, Justice Stevens’ landmark Lackey Memorandum
invited lower courts to consider the issue. “Though the importance and novelty of the question . . . [suffice] to warrant review by this Court, those factors also provide a principled basis
for postponing consideration of the issue until after it has been

state constitution is not to be construed to forbid the death penalty. This
amendment remains in force; however, the Massachusetts statute allowing for
the imposition of the death penalty was later invalidated on separate constitutional grounds. Commonwealth v. Colon-Cruz, 393 Mass. 150 (1984). No legislation authorizing the death penalty has been passed in Massachusetts since
the Colon-Cruz decision, and the death penalty is considered effectively unavailable in the state. See, e.g., Alan Rogers, “Success—at Long Last”: The Abolition of the Death Penalty in Massachusetts, 1928–1984, 22 B.C. THIRD
WORLD L.J. 281, 352–53 (2002); Garrett Quinn, The Complicated History of
the Death Penalty in Massachusetts, from the Salem Witch Trials to Dzhokhar
Tsarnev, MASSLIVE (Feb. 12, 2014, 10:38 AM), http://www.masslive.com/
news/boston/index.ssf/2014/02/history_of_the_death_penalty_i.html.
149. Watson, 411 N.E.2d at 1283 (quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S.
238, 287–88 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring)).
150. Richmond v. Lewis, 948 F.2d 1473, 1491–92 (9th Cir. 1990), vacated,
986 F.2d 1583 (9th Cir. 1993) (noting that a prisoner should not be able to
benefit from the very delay that the prisoner sought).
151. In 1989, the European Court of Human Rights blocked extradition to
the United States of a German citizen detained in England for a capital murder charge in Virginia. Soering v. United Kingdom, 11 Eur. Ct. H.R. 439, 472–
75 (1989) (ruling that the anticipated six to eight year stay on death row prior
to execution would itself violate Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights prohibiting “torture or . . . inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment”). Construing a provision of the Jamaican Constitution, almost
identical to that of Article 3, the British Judicial Committee of the Privy
Council (the highest court of appeal for Jamaica and other Commonwealth
countries) held that execution after fourteen years on death row was unconstitutional. Pratt v. Attorney Gen. of Jamaica, [1994] 2 A.C. 1 (Jam.); The Court
Structure and Hierarchy, THE SUPREME COURT OF JAMAICA, http://
www.supremecourt.gov.jm/content/court-structure-and-hierarchy (last visited
Sept. 22, 2014). The court established the threshold of five years of death row
confinement as constituting “strong grounds” for a finding of unconstitutional
“inhuman or degrading punishment or other treatment.” Pratt, 2 A.C. at 35.
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152

addressed by other courts.” Because of “its legal complexity
and its potential for far-reaching consequences,” the issue
would benefit from further examination by the lower courts be153
fore it percolated up to the Supreme Court. Justice Thomas
assessed the lower courts’ response to Justice Stevens’ invitation as follows: “These courts have resoundingly rejected the
claim as meritless. I submit that the Court should consider the
154
Justice Breyer disagreed, replying
experiment concluded.”
that most courts have avoided the merits of Lackey claims and
155
denied them instead on procedural grounds. Though some
judges have agreed with Justices Stevens and Breyer as to the
156
seriousness of the issue, others have not. For example, one
Fourth Circuit judge dismissed it as “a mockery of our system
of justice, and an affront to law-abiding citizens . . . absurd . . .
frivolous . . . subterfuge . . . [a] manipulation . . . . . .[and] so157
phistic . . ..” Despite no lower court favorably recognizing a
158
Ninth Circuit Judge Arthur
Lackey claim at that time,
Alarcón conjectured in 2007 that the “Supreme Court may one
day grant certiorari to determine whether such delays violate
the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual
159
punishment.” Seven years later, and nineteen years after
Lackey, Judge Alarcón’s conjecture is one step closer to coming
152. Lackey v. Texas, 514 U.S. 1045, 1045 (1995) (Stevens, J., respecting
denial of certiorari).
153. Id. at 1047.
154. Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 992–93 (1999) (Thomas, J., concurring
in denial of certiorari).
155. Id. at 998–99 (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
156. E.g., Selsor v. Workman, No. 01-CV-0721-CVE-TWL, 2009 WL
3233806, at *44 (N.D. Okla. Sept. 29, 2009) (“This Court agrees that the issue
of whether it is cruel and unusual to hold an individual for decades on death
row raises a serious constitutional question.”); State v. Smith, 931 P.2d 1272,
1292 (Mont. 1996) (Leaphart, J., concurring) (“[L]ike Justices Stevens and
Breyer in Lackey v. Texas, I do not treat as completely without merit the argument that lengthy delays in the imposition of the death sentence may
amount to cruel and unusual punishment under the 8th Amendment.” (citation omitted)).
157. Turner v. Jabe, 58 F.3d 924, 933 (4th Cir. 1995) (Luttig, J., concurring).
158. See, e.g., Sansing v. Ryan, No. CV-11-1035-PHX-SRB, 2013 WL
474358, at *54 (D. Ariz. Feb. 7, 2013) (denying Lackey claim because neither
the Supreme Court nor federal circuit courts have recognized the claim as successfully establishing an Eighth Amendment violation); Carroll v. State, 114
So.3d 883, 889 (Fla. 2013) (quoting Pardo v. State, 108 So.3d 558, 569 (Fla.
2012)) (“‘[N]o federal or state court has accepted the argument that a prolonged stay on death row constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.’”).
159. Alarcón, supra note 8, at 711.
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to fruition. On July 16, 2014, Jones v. Chappell became the first
160
(American, post-Lackey) case to recognize a Lackey claim.
After Lackey, the issue again came before the Supreme
Court in certiorari petitions filed by prisoners drawing responses from Justice Stevens, Justice Breyer, or Justice Thomas, or some combination thereof, concerning their denial of certiorari. Among these petitions, the prisoner’s death row tenure
161
rose from seventeen years in Lackey in 1995, to thirty years

160. No. CV-09-02158-CJC, 2014 WL 3567365, at *1 (C.D. Cal. July 16,
2014) (ordering “California’s death penalty system unconstitutional and vacating petitioner’s death sentence” after petitioner had spent nineteen years on
death row). In ruling that Jones’ death sentence violated the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, the court found that
California’s dysfunctional administration of the death penalty produced systemically inordinate delay. Id. at *1–6. The average delay is twenty-five years.
Id. at *8. As a consequence of this delay, out of the many on death row, so few
will be actually executed (rather than die of old age while on death row) as to
make execution unconstitutionally arbitrary. Id. at *8–9. In addition to arbitrariness, the court found that the systemic delay undermined the penological
purposes upon which the constitutionality of capital punishment rests. Id. at
*9–11. “In California, the execution of a death sentence is so infrequent, and
the delays preceding it so extraordinary, that the death penalty is deprived of
any deterrent or retributive effect it might once have had. Such an outcome is
antithetical to any civilized notion of just punishment.” Id. at *9.
Of particular interest to the focus of this Article is the court’s analysis of
retribution. The court seems to find retribution undermined in three ways. Id.
at *10–11. First, the sheer interval of time between sentence and execution
frustrates retribution. Id. at *10. And the longer the delay, the greater the
diminution of retribution’s value. Id. Second, executions are too infrequent
and/or too few in number as to significantly further retribution. Id. at *11 (citing Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 311 (1972) (White, J., concurring)
(“[W]hen imposition of the [death] penalty reaches a certain degree of infrequency, it would be very doubtful that any existing general need for retribution would be measurably satisfied.”)). Third, those few being executed are so
randomly and arbitrarily selected as to be inconsistent with retribution. Id.
(“[T]he few executions [the State] does carry out are arbitrary . . . [and] simply
cannot be reconciled with the asserted purpose of retribution.” (citing Furman,
408 U.S. at 304–05 (Brennan, J., concurring) (“The asserted public belief that
murderers deserve to die is flatly inconsistent with the execution of a random
few.”))).
This Article’s approach to retribution is markedly different from Jones.
Where Jones assesses the impact on retribution from the sheer temporal delay
alone, this Article considers the possible nature and duration of pre-execution
death row incarceration. It assesses the impact on retribution of the combination of execution plus substantial death row incarceration depending on
whether that death row incarceration is construed as punishment, a mitigation of punishment, or simply nothing, or some combination thereof. See infra
Part III.
161. 514 U.S. 1045, 1045 (1995) (Stevens, J., respecting denial of certiorari).
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162

in Smith v. Arizona in 2007, and to thirty-nine years in Mu163
hammad v. Florida, in 2014. Justice Thomas wrote memo164
randa concurring in the denial of certiorari in four cases. Justice Stevens expressed support for the merit of the prisoners’
165
claims in three cases and stressed that denial of certiorari
“does not constitute a ruling on the merits” in two other cas166
167
es. Justice Breyer dissented in eight cases and agreed with
168
or joined Justice Stevens in two further cases. The next Section presents the arguments made by Justices Stevens, Breyer,
and Thomas, as well as others, regarding Lackey claims.
B. DEBATING THE LACKEY CLAIM
This Section first canvasses the principal arguments advanced by Justices Stevens and Breyer, as well as others, supporting the Lackey claim (that the Combination is unconstitutional). It next surveys the principal arguments of Justice
Thomas and others opposing the Lackey claim.
1. Unconstitutional as Cruel and Unusual Punishment
There are eight principal arguments supporting the Lackey
claim. The arguments primarily seek to establish the Combination as cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth

162. 552 U.S. 985, 985 (2007) (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
163. No. 13-8030-13A674, 2014 WL 37226, at *1 (U.S. Jan. 7, 2014)
(Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari and stay of execution).
164. See Johnson v. Bredesen, 558 U.S. 1067, 1070 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring in denial of certiorari); Thompson v. McNeil, 556 U.S. 1114, 1116
(2009) (Thomas, J., concurring in denial of certiorari); Foster v. Florida, 537
U.S. 990, 990 (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring in denial of certiorari); Knight v.
Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 990 (1999) (Thomas, J., concurring in denial of certiorari).
165. See Johnson, 558 U.S. at 1067 (Stevens, J., joined by Breyer, J., respecting denial of certiorari); Thompson, 556 U.S. at 1114 (Stevens, J., respecting denial of certiorari); Lackey, 514 U.S. at 1045.
166. See Foster, 537 U.S. at 990 (Stevens, J. respecting denial of certiorari);
Knight, 528 U.S. at 990 (Stevens, J., respecting denial of certiorari).
167. See Muhammad, 2014 WL 37226, at *1; Valle v. Florida, 132 S.Ct. 1, 1
(2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of stay from execution); Smith, 552
U.S. at 985; Thompson, 556 U.S. at 1119 (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari); Allen v. Ornoski, 546 U.S. 1136 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting from
denial of certiorari); Foster, 537 U.S. at 991 (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial
of certiorari); Knight, 528 U.S. at 993 (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari); Elledge v. Florida, 525 U.S. 944, 944 (1998) (Breyer, J., dissenting
from denial of certiorari).
168. See Johnson, 558 U.S. at 1067; Lackey, 514 U.S. at 1047.
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Amendment and Gregg. First, the substantial periods of DRI
169
common today are unusual. In Lackey, Justice Stevens argued that “a [seventeen-year] delay, if it ever occurred, certainly would have been rare in 1789, and thus the practice of the
170
Framers would not justify a denial of petitioner’s claim.” In
Foster v. Florida, Justice Breyer noted that twenty-seven years
171
on death row is “unusual by any standard.” Second, deter172
rence is not furthered. As Justice Stevens contended in Lackey, “the additional deterrent effect from an actual execution
now, on the one hand, as compared to 17 years on death row
followed by the prisoner’s continued incarceration for life, on
173
the other, seems minimal.” In Elledge v. Florida, Justice
Breyer maintained that after twenty-three years, “an execution
may well cease to serve the legitimate penological purposes [including deterrence] that otherwise provide a necessary consti174
tutional justification for the death penalty.” Third, retribu175
tion is not furthered. As Justice Stevens argued in Lackey,
169. E.g., People v. Simms, 736 N.E.2d 1092, 1143 (Ill. 2000) (Harrison,
C.J., dissenting) (“By the standards in effect when the United States Constitution was ratified, such a delay [fifteen years] would have been rare, if not unheard of.”); Kate McMahon, Dead Man Waiting: Death Row Delays, the Eighth
Amendment, and What Courts and Legislatures Can Do, 25 BUFF. PUB. INT.
L.J. 43, 49 (2007) (“At the time the Constitution was drafted, the Framers
were familiar with a system where the interim between conviction and execution would be a matter of days or weeks, not years or decades.”).
170. 514 U.S. at 1045.
171. 537 U.S. at 992.
172. See, e.g., Coleman v. Balkcom, 451 U.S. 949, 959 (1981) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting from denial of certiorari) (arguing that delays “lessen the deterrent
effect of the threat of capital punishment”); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238,
354 n.124 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring) (“For capital punishment to deter
anybody it must . . . follow swiftly upon completion of the offense.”); Smith v.
Mahoney, 611 F.3d 978, 1006 (9th Cir. 2010) (Fletcher, J., dissenting) (“It is
hard to see how Smith’s execution today [after twenty-seven years on death
row] would have any deterrent effect.”); Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Capital Punishment, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1035, 1035 (1989) (“[Y]ears of delay between sentencing and execution . . . undermine[] the deterrent effect.”).
173. 514 U.S. at 1046.
174. 525 U.S. 944, 945 (1998) (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
175. See, e.g., Smith, 611 F.3d at 1006 (Fletcher, J., dissenting) (“Executing
Smith after all this time [twenty-seven years on death row] would go far beyond what is necessary to satisfy society’s moral outrage . . . .”); Dwight
Aarons, Can Inordinate Delay Between a Death Sentence and Execution Constitute Cruel and Unusual Punishment?, 29 SETON HALL L. REV. 147, 178
(1998) (“[T]he execution of an inmate who has spent an inordinate period on
death row would likely not achieve retribution . . . .”); McMahon, supra note
169, at 50 (“The state can arguably be said to have already furthered its retributive goals by subjecting the offender to endure almost three decades in
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“the acceptable state interest in retribution has arguably been
satisfied by the severe punishment already inflicted [seventeen
176
years on death row].” Justice Lewis Powell stated that “[t]he
retributive value of the penalty is diminished as imposition of
sentence becomes ever farther removed from the time of the of177
fense.” Fourth, not only does substantial delay not further the
penological goals of deterrence and retribution, it undermines
178
them. In Thompson v. McNeil, Justice Stevens contended
that substantial delay “diminishes whatever possible benefit
society might receive from petitioner’s death. It would therefore
be appropriate to conclude that a punishment of death after
significant delay is ‘so totally without penological justification
179
that it results in the gratuitous infliction of suffering.’” In
Johnson v. Bredesen, Justices Stevens and Breyer concluded
that “the penological justifications for the death penalty dimin180
ish as the delay lengthens.” Fifth, the anxiety produced by
waiting for one’s death over a prolonged period of time and/or
the inhumane conditions of DRI constitute psychological torture which is cruel within the meaning of the Eighth Amend181
ment. Justice Stevens observed that “the delay itself subjects
near-solitary confinement . . . .”); Jessica Feldman, Comment, A Death Row
Incarceration Calculus: When Prolonged Death Row Imprisonment Becomes
Unconstitutional, 40 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 187, 198 (1999) (“When a state executes a prisoner after he or she has spent a prolonged period of time on death
row, the sentence is overly retributive.”).
176. 514 U.S. at 1045.
177. Powell, supra note 172, at 1041.
178. E.g., People v. Simms, 736 N.E.2d 1092, 1144 (Ill. 2000) (Harrison, J.,
dissenting) (“Retribution and deterrence, the two principal social purposes of
capital punishment, carry less and less force [after substantial delay].”); State
v. Azania, 865 N.E.2d 994, 1013 (Ind. 2007) (Boehm, J., dissenting) (“I . . . find
the reasoning of Justices Stevens and Breyer [that Lackey-type situations
frustrate retribution and deterrence and are cruel and unusual punishment]
to be persuasive and therefore would hold that the Indiana Constitution prevents further pursuit of the death penalty in this case [involving a twenty-five
year delay].”); Alarcón, supra note 8, at 709 (“Inordinate delays . . . undermine
the stated purposes of having the death penalty, namely retribution and deterrence.”); Steiker & Steiker, supra note 17, at 230 (“Deterrence is attenuated
when it is widely understood that an execution will not occur until many years
after sentence, if at all. Moreover, the retributive value of executions is diminished when the person executed has lived a ‘second lifetime’ on death row.”).
179. 556 U.S. 1114, 1115 (2009) (Stevens, J., respecting denial of certiorari)
(quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976)).
180. 558 U.S. 1067, 1069 (2009) (Breyer, J., respecting denial of certiorari).
181. See, e.g., Thompson, 556 U.S. at 1115 (citing the “dehumanizing effects” of the prisoner enduring “up to 23 hours per day in isolation in a 6- by 9foot cell”); Simms, 736 N.E.2d at 1143 (“Beyond a certain number of years and
a certain number of failed attempts by the State to secure a constitutionally
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death row inmates to decades of especially severe, dehumaniz182
ing conditions of confinement.” Justice Breyer found as a
“commonsense conclusion that 33 years in prison under threat
183
of execution is cruel.” Sixth, a growing number of the highest
courts in foreign countries ruled such lengthy delays to be cruel
and unusual punishment and/or a violation of internationally
184
recognized human rights. Even international courts accepting
the legality of capital punishment “‘have held that lengthy delay in administering a lawful death penalty renders the ulti185
mate execution in-human, degrading, or unusually cruel.’”
Seventh, DRI itself constitutes a separate and additional punishment that may be excessive when combined with capital
186
punishment. In Gomez v. Fierro, Justice Stevens maintained
that “delay can become so excessive as to constitute cruel and
187
unusual punishment.” And eighth, delay is often due not to
the prisoner filing frivolous petitions, but the prisoner lawfully
valid sentence of death, the litigation becomes a form of torture in and of itself.”); Aarons, supra note 175, at 149 (“While awaiting execution, capital defendants experience mental anguish . . . in violation of the Eighth Amendment.”).
182. Bredesen, 558 U.S. at 1069 (Stevens, J., respecting denial of certiorari).
183. Valle v. Florida, 132 S. Ct. 1, 1 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of stay).
184. E.g., Lackey v. Texas, 514 U.S. 1045, 1047 (1995) (Stevens, J., respecting denial of certiorari) (“[T]he highest courts in other countries have found
arguments such as petitioner’s to be persuasive.”); McKenzie v. Day, 57 F.3d
1461, 1487 (9th Cir.) (Norris, J., dissenting) (“McKenzie’s Eighth Amendment
claim draws further strength from three recent decisions of foreign courts criticizing the American ‘death row phenomenon.’”), opinion adopted on reh’g en
banc, 57 F.3d 1493 (9th Cir. 1995).
185. Valle, 132 S. Ct. at 1 (quoting Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 995
(1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari)).
186. See, e.g., Ceja v. Stewart, 134 F.3d 1368, 1369–70 (9th Cir. 1998)
(Fletcher, J., dissenting) (“The sentencing judge who initially decided that the
death sentence was the appropriate punishment now unequivocally states that
executing Jose Ceja now after 23 years of incarceration on death row is too
harsh a punishment for his crimes.”); Aarons, supra note 175, at 205 (“[T]he
period spent awaiting execution is itself a form of punishment regulated by
the Eighth Amendment.”); Alarcón, supra note 8, at 725 (“[D]eath row prisoners are being subjected to cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the
Eighth Amendment because of their prolonged imprisonment . . . .”); Steiker,
supra note 137, at 766 n.47 (“The lengthy waits on death row in anticipation of
execution . . . [may involve] disproportionality.”); Ryan S. Hedges, Note, Justices Blind: How the Rehnquist Court’s Refusal To Hear a Claim for Inordinate
Delay of Execution Undermines Its Death Penalty Jurisprudence, 74 S. CAL. L.
REV. 577, 607 (2001) (arguing that the death row prisoner “is receiving excessive punishment above and beyond his sentence”).
187. 519 U.S. 918, 918 (1996) (Stevens, J., joined by Breyer, J., dissenting).
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pursuing her legal rights and the faulty procedures implement188
ed and established by the states. In Knight v. Florida, Justice
Breyer observed that the delays were due, in significant part, to
189
states’ “constitutionally defective death penalty procedures.”
In Johnson v. Bredesen, Justice Stevens noted that the prisoner
was responsible for “little, if any” of the twenty-eight-year de190
lay.
2. Constitutional Punishment
There are ten principal arguments opposing the Lackey
claim (and defending the constitutionality of the Combination).
The arguments cluster around the lack of relevant precedent
that the Combination is unconstitutional, the view that recognition of a Lackey claim would be counterproductive, and the
notion that prisoners are responsible for and benefit from the
delay. First, there is no binding American precedent establish191
ing the unconstitutionality of the Combination. In Knight,
Justice Thomas concluded that there is neither Supreme Court
precedent nor any support in American constitutional law “for
the proposition that a defendant can avail himself of the panoply of appellate and collateral procedures and then complain
192
when his execution is delayed.” Second, international precedent and authority finding such punishment illegitimate is nei193
ther binding nor persuasive. In Foster v. Florida, acknowledg188. See, e.g., McKenzie, 57 F.3d at 1471 (“The extraordinary delay in carrying out his death sentence is not of McKenzie’s making.”); State v. Azania,
865 N.E.2d 994, 1012 (Ind. 2007) (Boehm, J., dissenting) (noting that the prisoner “has spent at least fifteen years on death row due to flaws in the criminal
justice system for which he bears no responsibility”); State v. Smith, 931 P.2d
1272, 1291 (Mont. 1996) (Leaphart, J., concurring) (“When a defendant is successful in his appeals, it cannot fairly be said that he is merely filing frivolous
appeals in order to buy time.”).
189. 528 U.S. at 993.
190. 558 U.S. 1067, 1067 (2009) (Stevens, J., respecting denial of certiorari).
191. E.g., Thompson v. Sec’y for the Dep’t of Corr., 517 F.3d 1279, 1284
(11th Cir. 2008) (denying prisoner’s Lackey claim “given the total absence of
Supreme Court precedent”); Gardner v. State, 234 P.3d 1115, 1142 n.231
(Utah 2010) (“The courts . . . have uniformly rejected Lackey claims.”).
192. 528 U.S. at 990 (Thomas, J., concurring in denial of certiorari).
193. See, e.g., McKenzie, 57 F.3d at 1466 (“With all due respect to our colleagues abroad, we do not believe this view [that delayed executions are unlawful] will prevail in the United States.”); Booker v. McNeil, No.
1:08cv143/RS, 2010 WL 3942866, *40–41 (N.D. Fla. Oct. 5, 2010) (denying
prisoner’s claim that “binding norms of international law” prohibit his execution after twenty-nine years on death row), aff’d, 684 F.3d 1121 (11th Cir.
2012).
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ing that international precedent continues to side against the
permissibility of such lengthy delays, Justice Thomas declared
that “this Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence should not
194
impose foreign moods, fads, or fashions on Americans.” Third,
195
all punishment produces anxiety. Moreover, Justice Thomas
conjectured, even “[m]urderers . . . who are not apprehended
and tried suffer from the fear and anxiety that they will one
196
day be caught and punished for their crimes.” Fourth, recog197
nizing a Lackey claim would only exacerbate the delay. In
Knight, Justice Thomas suggested that allowing a Lackey claim
would generate the counterproductive effect of “prolong[ing]
collateral review by giving virtually every capital prisoner yet
another ground on which to challenge and delay his execu198
tion.” Fifth, recognizing Lackey claims would promote “speed
199
rather than accuracy.” Justice Thomas feared that reviewing
courts might give “short shrift to a capital defendant’s legitimate claims so as to avoid violating the Eighth Amendment
200
right suggested by Justice Breyer.” Sixth, the delay results
201
from adherence to due process and constitutional safeguards.
“‘Consistency would seem to demand that those who accept our
death penalty jurisprudence as a given also accept the lengthy
delay between sentencing and execution as a necessary conse-

194. 537 U.S. 990, 990 n.* (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring in denial of certiorari).
195. See, e.g., Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Law and the Emotions: The Problems
of Affective Forecasting, 80 IND. L.J. 155, 198 (2005) (noting that psychological
dysfunction may be no greater on death row than for non-capital prisoners in
“supermax” prisons); Sadoff, supra note 140, at 106 (“[T]he very passage of
time could in fact lessen—not heighten—the anxiety an inmate feels with regard to the prospect of death.”).
196. Foster, 537 U.S. at 991.
197. See Gardner v. State, 234 P.3d 1115, 1143 (Utah 2010) (invoking the
prospect of “endless delay”).
198. Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 992 (1999) (Thomas, J., concurring in
denial of certiorari).
199. McKenzie v. Day, 57 F.3d 1461, 1467 (9th Cir. 1995); accord Moore v.
State, 771 N.E.2d 46, 55 (Ind. 2002) (“To ensure the just administration of the
death penalty the value of speed should not trump the value of accuracy.”).
200. Knight, 528 U.S. at 992.
201. E.g., Johnson v. Bredesen, 558 U.S. 1067, 1072–73 (2009) (Thomas, J.,
concurring in denial of certiorari) (delay is unavoidable given the requisite
procedural safeguards that defendants enjoy); Chambers v. Bowersox, 157
F.3d 560, 570 (8th Cir. 1998) (“[D]elay, in large part, is a function of the desire
of our courts, state and federal, to get it right, to explore exhaustively, or at
least sufficiently, any argument that might save someone’s life.”).
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202

quence.’” Seventh, the delay results from prisoners’ frivolous
203
appeals. In Knight, Justice Thomas argued that “[i]t is incongruous to arm capital defendants with an arsenal of ‘constitutional’ claims with which they may delay their executions, and
simultaneously to complain when executions are inevitably de204
layed.” Eighth, the delay is the choice of, under the control of,
205
and the responsibility of, the prisoner. Justice Thomas noted
that a prisoner objecting to delay is not without options: “Petitioner could long ago have ended his ‘anxieties and uncertainties’ by submitting to what the people of Florida have deemed
206
him to deserve: execution.” Ninth, the State is not intention207
ally delaying the execution. As the court in Chambers v.
Bowersox explained, “there is no evidence, not even a claim,
that the State has deliberately sought to convict [the prisoner]
invalidly in order to prolong the time before it could secure a
208
valid conviction and execute him.” And tenth, “the delay in
carrying out death sentences has been of benefit to death row
209
Judge
inmates, allowing them to extend their lives . . . .”
Kozinski characterized prisoners’ efforts to challenge their sen-

202. Thompson v. McNeil, 556 U.S. 1114, 1117 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring in denial of certiorari) (quoting Knight, 528 U.S. at 992).
203. See, e.g., State v. McKenzie, 894 P.2d 289, 294 (Mont. 1995)
(Leaphart, J., dissenting) (“Obviously the Court cannot allow a defendant to
bootstrap himself into a cruel and unusual punishment argument by abusing
the system to his advantage through the repetitive filing of meritless appeals
and petitions.”); Michael P. Connolly, Better Never than Late: Prolonged Stays
on Death Row Violate the Eighth Amendment, 23 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV.
CONFINEMENT 101, 111 (1997) (describing the variety of inappropriate and
abusive tactics used by defense attorneys to delay executions).
204. 528 U.S. at 992.
205. E.g., Thompson, 556 U.S. at 1117 (noting that the prisoner could have
accepted his execution but “chose” to challenge it); Bieghler v. State, 839
N.E.2d 691, 697 (Ind. 2005) (“[T]he [twenty-four years] between his conviction
and the approaching execution flows from his having availed himself of the
appeals process.”).
206. Foster v. Florida, 537 U.S. 990, 991 (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring in
denial of certiorari) (quoting id. at 993 (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari)).
207. See, e.g., White v. Johnson, 79 F.3d 432, 439 (5th Cir. 1996) (“[The
prisoner] cannot now complain of cruel and unusual punishment. . . . [He] does
not offer any evidence that Texas’ delay in considering his petition was intentional or even negligent.”); Porter v. Singletary, 49 F.3d 1483, 1485 (11th Cir.
1995) (per curiam) (rejecting prisoner’s Lackey claim because, in part, the
prisoner “has proffered no evidence to establish that delays in his case have
been attributable to negligence or deliberate action of the state”).
208. 157 F.3d 560, 570 (8th Cir. 1998).
209. McKenzie v. Day, 57 F.3d 1461, 1467 (9th Cir. 1995).

CHRISTOPHER_5fmt

452

11/30/2014 2:28 PM

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[99:421

tence as “diminishing the severity of their sentence by endless210
ly postponing the day of reckoning.”
In addition to disagreeing about the seriousness of Lackey
claims and the constitutionality of the Combination, capital
punishment opponents and proponents even disagree about the
status of DRI—cruel and unusual punishment versus lifeextending benefit. In an attempt to advance the debate and
break the impasse between the capital punishment proponents
and opponents, the next Part converts some of the above unsupported assertions into supported arguments and applies retributivism to five possible approaches to the legal status of
substantial DRI.
III. CAPITAL PUNISHMENT PLUS SUBSTANTIAL DEATH
ROW INCARCERATION VIOLATES RETRIBUTIVISM
Because the status of substantial DRI is unclear, this Part
presents the five possible conceptions of such incarceration.
First, it constitutes an aggravation of, or a punishment additional to, capital punishment. Second, substantial DRI serves
as a mitigation, or reduction, of the capital punishment. Third,
it is either additional punishment or a mitigation of capital
punishment. Fourth, substantial DRI is both additional punishment and a mitigation of capital punishment. Under each of
these four approaches, this Part demonstrates that the Combination is disproportional, undeserved, and unjustified under retributivism. The fifth approach views substantial DRI as neither additional punishment nor a mitigation of the capital
punishment—it is legally and retributively nothing. Though
possibly allowing retributivism to justify the Combination, this
fifth approach yields an absurdity. The significant number of
death row prisoners who die of old age or natural causes prior
to execution would receive no punishment whatsoever, despite
being in state custody for decades, for their most heinous of
crimes. The resulting dilemma is that either substantial DRI
culminating in death by execution is unjustified under retributivism or such incarceration culminating in death by old age, or
non-execution causes, entails the absurdity of blameworthy,
convicted capital offenders receiving no punishment whatsoever. After considering various ways to resolve the dilemma, this
Part concludes that the preferable resolution is to convert
210. Alex Kozinski, Tinkering with Death, in DEBATING THE DEATH PEN7 (Hugo Adam Bedau & Paul G. Cassell eds., 2004).

ALTY 1,

CHRISTOPHER_5fmt

2014]

11/30/2014 2:28 PM

DEATH DELAYED

453

death sentences to life imprisonment. Finally, this Part anticipates and rebuts three possible objections.
A. ADDITIONAL PUNISHMENT—DISPROPORTIONALLY EXCESSIVE
Viewing substantial DRI as additional punishment is perhaps the most obvious approach. Simple common sense suggests that decades-long DRI, under conditions equal to if not
worse than temporal terms of imprisonment, constitutes pun211
ishment. It is punishment in addition to, and in aggravation
212
of, the capital punishment. Justices Stevens and Breyer, oth213
214
and numerous commentators
adopt this aper judges,
proach, but fail to explain fully how substantial DRI constitutes
additional punishment.
While perhaps not crucial, establishing DRI as punishment
is helpful in two ways in demonstrating that the Combination
is unconstitutional. First, “[t]he Eighth Amendment does not

211. For examples of the common-sense view that what looks like punishment should be understood as punishment, see Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 113
(2003) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[A] sanction that (1) is imposed on everyone
who commits a [particular] criminal offense, (2) is not imposed on anyone else,
and (3) severely impairs a person’s liberty is punishment.”); Jenny Roberts,
The Mythical Divide Between Collateral and Direct Consequences of Criminal
Convictions: Involuntary Commitment of “Sexually Violent Predators,” 93
MINN. L. REV. 670, 708–09 (2008) (asserting that civil commitment of certain
sex offenders is “quite similar to incarceration” and thus constitutes punishment).
212. Coleman v. Balkcom, 451 U.S. 949, 952 (1981) (Stevens, J., concurring
in denial of certiorari) (“If the death sentence is ultimately set aside, or its execution delayed for a prolonged period, the imprisonment during that period is
nevertheless a significant form of punishment.”); supra note 187 and accompanying text.
213. United States ex rel. DelVecchio v. Ill. Dept. of Corr., No. 95 C 6637,
1995 WL 688675, at *8 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 17, 1995) (acknowledging that prisoner’s
sixteen years of DRI may constitute “additional punishment”); see, e.g., People
v. Ochoa, 28 P.3d 78, 115 (Cal. 2001) (arguing that prisoner’s nine years of
DRI furthers the goals of punishment by “increasing the penalty imposed for
the commission of capital crimes”), abrogated by People v. Harris, 185 P.3d
727 (Cal. 2008); cf. Ceja v. Stewart, 134 F.3d 1368, 1369 (9th Cir. 1998)
(Fletcher, J., dissenting) (characterizing the prisoner’s twenty-three years of
DRI as a “de facto sentence”).
214. See, e.g., Daniel Givelber, Innocence Abroad: The Extradition Cases
and the Future of Capital Litigation, 81 OR. L. REV. 161, 171 (2002) (“[D]eath
row itself represents unacceptable punishment.”); Adam M. Samaha, Undue
Process, 59 STAN. L. REV. 601, 668 (2006) (“Incarceration pending execution is
undoubtedly a component of punishment . . . .”); Steiker & Steiker, supra note
17, at 230–31 (“The death penalty now encompasses two separate punishments: lengthy incarceration . . . followed by an execution.” (emphasis added));
supra note 186 and accompanying text.
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outlaw cruel and unusual ‘conditions’; it outlaws cruel and un215
usual ‘punishments.’” If substantial DRI is not punishment,
then one might challenge Lackey claim supporters to explain
how the addition of a nonpunishment (DRI) to a punishment
that is not clearly cruel and unusual (capital punishment) combines to create a cruel and unusual punishment. If instead, DRI
is punishment, it is easier to explain how the addition of one
punishment to a second punishment that is not cruel and unusual might combine to create a cruel and unusual punishment.
Second, capital punishment is unconstitutional if it fails to further the legitimate penological goals of punishment, including
216
retributivism. As a justification of punishment, that which
retributivism finds justified or unjustified is most clearly pun217
ishment. If substantial DRI is not punishment, then one
might again challenge Lackey claim supporters to explain how
the addition of a nonpunishment (DRI) to a justified punishment (capital punishment) combines to create an unjustified
punishment. But, if instead, substantial DRI is punishment,
then it is easier to explain how the addition of one punishment
to a second, justified punishment might create a combined unjustified punishment.
218
While clearly a punishment “look-alike[],” whether substantial DRI constitutes (criminal) punishment or instead a civ219
il, regulatory sanction is far from clear. No American court
215. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994) (emphasis added); accord Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 300 (1991) (stressing that the Eighth
Amendment “bans only cruel and unusual punishment”).
216. See supra notes 56–57, 64–71, 90–92 and accompanying text.
217. A variant of retributivism applies to suffering regardless of whether it
comes in a punitive or non-punitive form. See Mitchell N. Berman, Two Kinds
of Retributivism, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CRIMINAL LAW 433,
437–38 (R. A. Duff & Stuart P. Green eds., 2011) (explaining that retributivism maintains offenders deserve suffering, even if it does not constitute punishment); Husak, supra note 107, at 972 (“[O]ur retributive beliefs only require that culpable wrongdoers be given their just deserts by being made to
suffer [regardless of whether it constitutes punishment].”). Of course, under
this version of retributivism it would be far easier to establish the Combination as disproportionally excessive and unjustified. Even if the substantial
DRI does not constitute punishment, it clearly constitutes suffering. Knight v.
Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 994 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“It is difficult to deny
the suffering inherent in a prolonged wait for execution . . . .”). But an argument relying on an atypical version of retributivism would presumably fail to
persuade capital punishment proponents.
218. Kolber, supra note 26, at 1142 (referring to nominally civil sanctions
that involve the same suffering and deprivation as punishment).
219. In general, whether a nominally civil sanction is so punitive in effect
as to constitute criminal punishment is a “problem [that] has been extremely
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considering a Lackey claim has held that it does constitute punishment. But equally, no such court has held that it does not
constitute punishment. Under the federal Bail Reform Act,
post-conviction, pre-punishment confinement nominally consti220
221
tutes a detention similar to a pre-trial detention. In United
States v. Salerno, the Supreme Court considered whether the
Bail Reform Act’s authorization of pre-trial detention of the defendants on the ground that they posed a danger to the com222
munity constituted impermissible punishment. Noting that
not all detentions constitute punishment, the Court first looked
223
to legislative intent and then whether the detention was ex224
cessive in relation to any legitimate regulatory goal. “The legislative history . . . clearly indicates that Congress did not formulate the pretrial detention provisions as punishment for
225
dangerous individuals.” Rather, “preventing danger to the
226
community is a legitimate regulatory goal.” The Court “conclude[d] that the detention imposed by the Act falls on the reg227
ulatory side of the dichotomy.”
Though a broad reading of Salerno suggests that all (not
just pre-trial) detentions imposed by the Bail Reform Act are
difficult and elusive of solution.” Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144,
168 (1963). For critical views on drawing the punitive/nonpunitive distinction,
see United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 760 (1987) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (criticizing the Court’s manipulation of the punitive/regulatory distinction
as “merely redefin[ing] any measure which is claimed to be punishment as
‘regulation,’ and, magically, the Constitution no longer prohibits its imposition”); Gabriel J. Chin, The New Civil Death: Rethinking Punishment in the
Era of Mass Incarceration, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1789, 1808 (2012) (lamenting
that “the quest for a sharp difference between punitive and regulatory
measures is futile”).
220. 18 U.S.C. § 3141(b) (2012) (“A judicial officer of a court . . . shall order
that, pending imposition or execution of sentence, or pending appeal of conviction or sentence, a person be released or detained under this chapter.”).
221. For discussion of Eighth Amendment claims concerning pretrial detention, see Catherine T. Struve, The Conditions of Pretrial Detention, 161 U.
PA. L. REV. 1009 (2013).
222. 481 U.S. at 745–48 (majority opinion).
223. Id. at 746–47 (“[T]he mere fact that a person is detained does not inexorably lead to the conclusion that the government has imposed punishment.
To determine whether a restriction on liberty constitutes impermissible punishment or permissible regulation, we first look to legislative intent.” (citation
omitted)).
224. Id. at 747 (citing and applying two factors of the seven-factor test from
Kennedy, 372 U.S. at 168–69). For discussion of the seven-factor test, see infra
notes 235–38 and accompanying text.
225. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 747.
226. Id.
227. Id.
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nonpunitive, the substantial DRI challenged in Lackey claims
still might constitute punishment under Salerno for two reasons. First, the Court noted that “the maximum length of pretrial detention is limited by the stringent time limitations of
228
the Speedy Trial Act.” In a subsequent case, the Court also
stressed that the detention found constitutional in Salerno was
229
“strictly limited in duration.” Quite plausibly, upwards of
thirty years or more of DRI would exceed such stringent and
strict limitations on the duration of the detention. Second, the
Court strongly suggested that sufficiently lengthy detention
constitutes punishment: “We intimate no view as to the point at
which detention in a particular case might become excessively
prolonged, and therefore punitive, in relation to Congress’ regu230
latory goal.” While unsure of the precise point at which the
duration of a detention would convert it from regulatory to punitive, the Court is clearly stating that a sufficiently lengthy
detention constitutes punishment. Surely, over thirty years of
DRI qualifies as “excessively prolonged, and therefore puni231
tive.” If not, what possible period of detention could qualify?
Apart from Salerno, there is another basis for DRI to constitute additional punishment. Nominally civil sanctions may
nonetheless constitute punishment under the “‘intent-effects’
232
test.” The test’s first step assesses the legislature’s intention
233
as to the nature of the sanction. If the legislature’s intent was
that the sanction be punishment, the test is complete and the
234
sanction is punishment. If the legislature instead intended to
establish a civil sanction, the test is not complete. Undertaking
the test’s second step, courts “‘have inquired further whether
the statutory scheme was so punitive either in purpose or effect’ as to ‘transfor[m] what was clearly intended as a civil rem235
edy into a criminal penalty.’”

228. Id. (footnote omitted).
229. Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 82 (1992).
230. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 747 n.4 (emphasis added). This proposition continues to have vitality. See, e.g., United States v. Stanford, 722 F. Supp. 2d
803, 806, 808 (S.D. Tex. 2010) (citing and quoting this proposition).
231. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 747 n.4.
232. Russell v. Gregoire, 124 F.3d 1079, 1084 (9th Cir. 1997).
233. See Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 99 (1997); see also Kennedy
v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 169 (1963).
234. See Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 92 (2003); Hudson, 522 U.S. at 99;
Kennedy, 372 U.S. at 169.
235. Hudson, 522 U.S. at 99 (quoting United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242,
248–49 (1980)).
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This second step assesses the effects of the nominally civil
sanction by considering the following seven Kennedy v. Mendo236
za-Martinez factors:
(1) “[W]hether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint”; (2) “whether it has historically been regarded as a punishment”; (3) “whether it comes into play only on a finding of scienter”;
(4) “whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of punishment—retribution and deterrence”; (5) “whether the behavior to
which it applies is already a crime”; (6) “whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be connected is assignable for it”; and
(7) “whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative pur237
pose assigned.”

The Court emphasizes that “‘these factors must be considered
238
in relation to the statute on its face’” and that “‘only the
clearest proof’ will suffice to override legislative intent and
transform what has been denominated a civil remedy into a
239
criminal penalty.’”
DRI clearly satisfies the first five factors. Incarceration is
240
clearly an affirmative restraint on physical liberty (factor 1)
that has historically been regarded as a paradigmatic punish241
ment (factor 2) promoting the traditional aims of punishment
(factor 4). And a finding of the requisite criminal mens rea of
242
the offense (factor 3) and the criminal behavior constituting
the offense (factor 5) necessarily precedes the imposition of
DRI.

236. Doe, 538 U.S. at 97 (citing Kennedy, 372 U.S. at 168–69).
237. Hudson, 522 U.S. at 99–100 (quoting Kennedy, 372 U.S. at 168–69)
(emphasis omitted).
238. Hudson, 522 U.S. at 100 (quoting Kennedy, 372 U.S. at 169). In a previous case, the Court adopted a different standard—evaluating the “actual
sanctions imposed.” United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 447 (1989). Hudson
rejects the Halper test as “ill considered.” Hudson, 522 U.S. at 101.
239. Hudson, 522 U.S. at 100 (quoting Ward, 448 U.S. at 249).
240. See, e.g., Doe, 538 U.S. at 100 (referring to “the punishment of imprisonment, which is the paradigmatic affirmative disability or restraint” (citing
Hudson, 522 U.S. at 104)).
241. See, e.g., Hudson, 522 U.S. at 104 (referring to the “‘infamous punishment’ of imprisonment” (quoting Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 617
(1960))); Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 685 (1978) (“Confinement in a prison . . . is a form of punishment subject to scrutiny under Eighth Amendment
standards.”).
242. Cf. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 362 (1997) (“[U]nlike a criminal statute, no finding of scienter is required to commit an individual who is
found to be a sexually violent predator.”). In contrast, death row incarceration
may only follow conviction under a criminal statute and thus after a finding of
the requisite scienter.
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DRI, however, fails to satisfy at least one of the last two
factors. Factor 6 is clearly not satisfied: there are non-punitive
purposes served by DRI including safeguarding the community
and ensuring the presence of the convict at the imposition of
243
his punishment. Regarding factor 7, the sanction actually
imposed—upwards of thirty years or more of DRI—is arguably
excessive relative to the above goals. But considering, as Hudson v. United States requires, the sanction imposed by “‘the
244
statute on its face’” —a period of indefinite detention—it is
arguably not excessive. As discussed above, however, Salerno
specifically stated that a sufficiently prolonged detention would
245
be excessive and thus constitute punishment. Moreover, it is
unclear whether the Hudson standard of assessing the sanction
246
“‘on its face’” is still required. In a case subsequent to Hud247
son, the Court failed to require the Hudson standard. As a result, it is unclear whether the seventh factor supports detention pending imposition of a sentence as punitive or nonpunitive.
Whether satisfaction of five or possibly six of the seven fac248
tors meets the proviso that “‘only the clearest proof’” suffices
to transform a nominal civil sanction into a criminal punish249
ment is unclear. But given that there is no requirement that
250
all of the factors be satisfied, satisfaction of five or six of the
seven factors may well constitute the requisite ‘“clearest
251
proof.’” As a result, the nominally civil sanction of DRI plausibly qualifies as punishment.
An exhaustive and definitive analysis of whether sufficiently prolonged DRI constitutes punishment is both beyond
243. See 18 U.S.C. § 3143 (2012) (authorizing detention to prevent the convict from “flee[ing] or pos[ing] a danger to the . . . community”).
244. 522 U.S. at 100 (quoting Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144,
169 (1963)).
245. See supra text accompanying notes 223–24.
246. Hudson, 522 U.S. at 100 (quoting Kennedy, 372 U.S. at 169).
247. See Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 97–105 (2003) (applying the sevenfactor test without mentioning the ‘on its face’ Hudson standard).
248. Hudson, 522 U.S. at 100 (quoting United States v. Ward, 448 U.S.
242, 249 (1980)).
249. On the difficulty of clearly applying the factors, see Wayne A. Logan,
The Ex Post Facto Clause and the Jurisprudence of Punishment, 35 AM. CRIM.
L. REV. 1261, 1282 (1998) (“The Mendoza-Martinez factors over the years have
been applied in a highly selective and ultimately inconsistent manner.”).
250. See Hudson, 522 U.S. at 99–105; see also Ward, 448 U.S. at 249 (characterizing the factors as “neither exhaustive nor dispositive”).
251. Hudson, 522 U.S. at 100 (quoting Ward, 448 U.S. at 249).
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the scope and unnecessary for the purposes of this Article.
Apart from the assertions of Justices Stevens and Breyer, other
252
judges, and commentators, there are two bases for sufficiently prolonged death row detention to formally constitute punishment. First, Salerno conceives of sufficiently prolonged de253
tention as punishment. Second, satisfying five or six factors of
the seven-factor test for punitive effect plausibly establishes
254
That the
sufficiently prolonged detention as punishment.
nominally civil sanction of DRI, particularly when sufficiently
prolonged, merely plausibly constitutes punishment suffices to
ground DRI as punishment as one of the five possible approaches to the status of substantial DRI.
If substantial DRI constitutes punishment, the following
argument demonstrates that the Combination is disproportionally excessive, undeserved, and unjustified under retributivism:
(1) Under retributivism, death by execution matches the
moral and legal desert of at least some offenders. Death by execution, for such offenders, is a proportional, deserved, and justified punishment.
(2) Therefore, punishment substantially greater, or substantially less, than capital punishment would not match the
moral and legal desert of such offenders. Such punishment
would thus be disproportional, undeserved, and unjustified under retributivism.
(3) Substantial DRI constitutes a substantial, additional
punishment.
(4) Therefore, the Combination is disproportionally excessive, undeserved, and unjustified under retributivism for such
offenders.
Explaining each step in the argument might be helpful.
Step 1 accepts as a premise that retributivism justifies capital
255
punishment for at least some offenders. Following from step
1, step 2 reasons that if capital punishment alone is the punishment that an offender deserves (and thus is proportional
and justified) under retributivism, then a punishment substantially different than capital punishment would be undeserved,
disproportional, and unjustified. A punishment substantially
252. See supra notes 185–86, 211–13 and accompanying text.
253. See supra text accompanying notes 223–29.
254. See supra text accompanying notes 236–51.
255. For the view that, under retributivism, death by execution is the only
deserved, proportional, and justified punishment for some offenders, see supra
notes 131–36 and accompanying text.
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greater or more severe than capital punishment alone would
thus be undeserved, disproportionally excessive, and unjustified under retributivism.
While steps 1–2, as well as 4, are fairly straightforward,
step 3 is easily contested. Step 3 asserts as a premise that substantial DRI constitutes substantial, additional punishment.
While the premise reflects a plausible approach to the status of
256
DRI, there are other approaches that are also plausible. The
premise of step 3 is not strenuously argued for or defended because one may reject step 3 while still reaching the same conclusion that the Combination is unjustified under retributivism. In arguments below, different premises as to the status of
substantial DRI will replace the premise of step 3. Even with
this replacement, the conclusion will remain that retributivism
is unsatisfied.
Step 4 concludes that if capital punishment alone is the
proportional, deserved, and justified punishment under retributivism for some offenders, and if substantial DRI constitutes a
substantial, additional punishment, then the Combination is
disproportional, undeserved, and unjustified under retributivism for such offenders. If capital punishment alone is the proportional, deserved, and justified punishment under retributivism for a particular offender, then adding a substantial
punishment to the capital punishment necessarily makes the
Combination disproportionally excessive, undeserved, and unjustified under retributivism.
One might concede that substantial DRI constitutes punishment in addition to death by execution but object that it is
additional punishment integral to the offender’s sentence of
capital punishment. That is, rather than it being additional
punishment extrinsic to the capital punishment it is additional
257
punishment intrinsic to the capital punishment. Under this
objection, capital punishment that includes the integral component of the additional punishment of substantial DRI is nothing more than capital punishment itself. Given the stipulated
256. See supra text accompanying notes 252–54.
257. See People v. Frye, 959 P.2d 183, 263 (Cal. 1998) (“Confinement in
prison following a judgment of death is part and parcel of the administration
of the death penalty.”); MATTHEW H. KRAMER, THE ETHICS OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 108 (2011) (discussing the issue outside of the Lackey claim context
and arguing that for a person sentenced to death, “his incarceration on death
row is itself a part of his [capital] punishment”). But see PRIMORATZ, supra
note 101, at 164 (“[T]he interval between sentencing someone to death and
carrying out the sentence is not a part of capital punishment itself.”).
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premise that retributivism justifies capital punishment (step 1
in the above argument), a capital punishment that includes
everything which is integral or intrinsic to capital punishment
must also be justified.
The objection fails, however, because the concession which
is a premise of the objection is fatal to the objection. Conceding
that substantial DRI constitutes additional punishment
(whether extrinsic or intrinsic) triggers the possible problem of
explaining why some convicted capital offenders receive a punishment of death by execution plus, for example, thirty years
imprisonment on death row and some receive death by execution plus only five years on death row. If the former are more
blameworthy and thus deserving of more punishment than the
latter, then there is no problem. Each might be receiving the
punishment each deserves. But there does not seem to be any
correlation between extra years on death row and greater desert. Offenders spend more or less time on death row depending
258
on procedural issues that have little to do with their desert. If
any correlation exists, however, it would be an inverse correlation. Offenders with comparatively less desert spend more time
on death row because their guilt, and the procedures that established their guilt, are more open to attack and litigation
259
which thereby extends their time on death row. In contrast,
offenders whose guilt was soundly established will have comparatively fewer opportunities to litigate and thereby extend
their time on death row. As a result, conceding that substantial
DRI is additional punishment undermines the objection. The
objection fails because greater amounts of the additional punishment of DRI (even if integral to the capital punishment) are
258. See Dan Markel, Executing Retributivism: Panetti and the Future of
the Eighth Amendment, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1163, 1197 (2009) (noting that rather than the extent of the delay between sentencing and execution being
based on retributivist considerations of desert, “the delay occurs largely because of procedural wrangling”).
259. See People v. Simms, 736 N.E.2d 1092, 1143 (Ill. 2000) (Harrison, C.J.,
dissenting) (“In nearly every instance where an execution remains to be carried out after a decade or more, the additional litigation has been necessary to
address errors occasioned by the prosecution or attributable to incompetent
representation.”); Dwight Aarons, Getting out of This Mess: Steps Toward Addressing and Avoiding Inordinate Delay in Capital Cases, 89 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1, 1 (1998) (“[A] defendant is more likely to be on death row for
an inordinate period when the case is on the margins of death eligibility and
errors occur during the state’s processing of the case.”). As an example, consider Elledge v. Florida, 525 U.S. 944 (1998) (Breyer, J., dissenting to denial of
certiorari), in which the prisoner’s “three successful appeals account for 18 of
the 23 years of delay.” Id. at 945 (emphasis added).
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not based on greater desert and are thus unjustified under retributivism.
B. MITIGATION—DISPROPORTIONALLY LENIENT
Courts rejecting Lackey claims often argue that rather
than prejudicing prisoners, substantial DRI supplies the bene260
fit of extended life. Some courts and commentators further
argue that the benefit of extended life reduces or lessens the
261
severity or retributive value of the capital punishment.
Though the relevance is unclear, these arguments are meant to
supply a basis for rejecting Lackey claims. These arguments
suggest the second possible approach to the status of substantial DRI: it is a reduction or diminution of the capital punishment. Rather than an aggravation, it is a mitigation of the capital punishment. As one court explained in comparing capital
with noncapital punishment, “[i]t is the common judgment of
man that . . . punishment which leaves life is less than that
262
which ends it.” On this basis, punishment that leaves more
life (delayed capital punishment) is less than that which leaves
less life (undelayed capital punishment).
Accepting the claim that substantial DRI constitutes a mitigation of capital punishment, however, does not support the
position of the capital punishment proponents who advance the
claim. Accepting the claim does not lead to the conclusion that
the Combination is justified under retributivism. Retributivism
requires that offenders be given the punishment that they de263
serve—no more and no less. Punishments less than what are
deserved are as unjustified as punishments that are more than
264
what are deserved. Thus, undeserved mitigations of punishments are no less unjustified than undeserved aggravations of
260. See, e.g., State v. Schackart, 947 P.2d 315, 336 (Ariz. 1997) (en banc)
(rejecting prisoner’s Lackey claim because, in part, “delay in carrying out executions benefits inmates, allowing them to extend their lives” (citing McKenzie
v. Day, 57 F.3d 1461, 1466–67 (9th Cir. 1995))); People v. Hill, 839 P.2d 984,
1018 (Cal. 1992) (in bank [sic]) (denying Lackey claim because, in part, “the
delay—again, no matter how long—benefitted defendant rather than prejudiced him because the delay prolonged his life”).
261. E.g., People v. Ochoa, 28 P.3d 78, 115 (Cal. 2001) (“[D]efendant, by delaying his execution for these past nine years, has already reduced the full retributive function of execution, and indefinitely rendered his status more like
that of a life prisoner . . . .”); supra note 209 and accompanying text.
262. People ex rel. Patrick v. Frost, 117 N.Y.S. 524, 527–28 (App. Div.
1909).
263. See supra notes 124–29 and accompanying text.
264. See supra notes 124–29 and accompanying text.
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punishment. The following argument, with this second approach as a new premise, demonstrates that the Combination is
disproportionally lenient, undeserved, and unjustified under
retributivism:
(1) Under retributivism, death by execution matches the
moral and legal desert of at least some offenders. Death by execution, for such offenders, is a proportional, deserved, and justified punishment.
(2) Therefore, punishment substantially greater, or substantially less, than capital punishment would not match the
moral and legal desert of such offenders. Such punishment
would thus be disproportional, undeserved, and unjustified under retributivism.
(3) Substantial DRI constitutes a substantial mitigation of
capital punishment.
(4) Therefore, the Combination is disproportionally lenient,
undeserved, and unjustified under retributivism for such offenders.
The argument is similar to the preceding argument in Part
III.A. The principal difference is the new premise in step 3.
While the premise reflects a plausible approach to the status of
265
DRI, there are other approaches that are also plausible. In
arguments below, different premises as to the status of substantial DRI will replace the premise of step 3. Even with this
replacement, the conclusion will remain that retributivism is
unsatisfied. Step 4 concludes that if capital punishment alone
is the proportional, deserved, and justified punishment under
retributivism for some offenders, and if substantial DRI constitutes a substantial mitigation of capital punishment, then the
Combination is disproportional, undeserved, and unjustified
266
under retributivism for such offenders.
One might object that imposing a punishment less severe
than what the offender deserves does satisfy one version of re267
tributivism, variously termed negative or weak retributivism.
A lessened or mitigated capital punishment would satisfy negative or weak retributivism, even for an offender who deserves a
full or unmitigated capital punishment. The difficulty with
negative retributivism, however, is that it fails to affirmatively

265. See supra notes 209–10, 260–62 and accompanying text.
266. Construing substantial DRI as a mitigation of capital punishment also
yields an absurdity. See infra Part III.E and note 295.
267. See supra note 129.
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268

provide a justification for any punishment. It merely provides
a ceiling on the amount of punishment that may justifiably be
269
imposed. A mitigated capital punishment would no more satisfy negative retributivism than a $5 fine or even no punishment—each is less than what the offender deserves. Imposing a
mitigated (or any type of) capital punishment that no more satisfies or contributes to the goals or purposes of negative retributivism than a $5 fine or even no punishment at all would be
pointless, needless, unnecessary, and thus excessive, and thus
270
cruel and unusual in violation of the Eighth Amendment.
Negative retributivism (allowing any lesser punishment or
even no punishment at all) violates the very claim on which the
proponents of the constitutionality of capital punishment depend—capital punishment, at least for some offenders, is the
only deserved, proportional, and justified punishment under re271
tributivism. As a result, the objection that a mitigated capital
punishment would satisfy negative retributivism, while true,
only serves to undermine the imposition of capital punishment
in general. For the capital punishment proponent, embracing
negative retributivism only hurts, it does not help.
C. EITHER ADDITIONAL PUNISHMENT OR MITIGATION—EITHER
DISPROPORTIONALLY EXCESSIVE OR LENIENT
Whether substantial DRI constitutes additional punish272
ment or a mitigation of capital punishment is unclear. Each
approach is plausible. From this uncertainty, a third possible
approach emerges: it is either additional punishment or a mitigation of capital punishment. The following argument, with
this third approach as a new premise, demonstrates that the
Combination is undeserved, disproportional, and unjustified
under retributivism:
(1) Under retributivism, death by execution matches the
moral and legal desert of at least some offenders. Death by execution, for such offenders, is a proportional, deserved, and justified punishment.
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.

See supra note 129.
See supra note 129.
See supra notes 56–57, 64–71 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 130–36 and accompanying text.
See Carol Steiker, The Death Penalty and Deontology, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF PHILOSOPHY OF CRIMINAL LAW 441, 446 (John Deigh & David
Dolinko eds., 2011) (“[I]t becomes difficult to know whether to consider lengthy
delay as a harm or a benefit to any particular death row inmate.”).
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(2) Therefore, punishment substantially greater, or substantially less, than capital punishment would not match the
moral and legal desert of such offenders. Such punishment
would thus be disproportional, undeserved, and unjustified under retributivism.
(3) Substantial DRI constitutes either a substantial additional punishment or a substantial mitigation of capital punishment.
(4) Therefore, the Combination is disproportional (either
excessive or lenient), undeserved, and unjustified under retributivism for such offenders.
The argument is similar to the two preceding arguments in
Part III.A–B. The principal difference is the new premise in
step 3. Regardless of the different premises, the conclusion of
each argument is largely the same—the Combination is disproportional (either excessive or lenient), undeserved, and unjusti273
fied under retributivism.
D. BOTH ADDITIONAL PUNISHMENT AND MITIGATION—
UNJUSTIFIED
While the previous approach was disjunctive, the fourth
approach is conjunctive. Substantial DRI is both additional
punishment and a mitigation of capital punishment. People v.
Ochoa, wherein the court found that a nine-year delay both increased and decreased the prisoner’s punishment, somewhat
274
illustrates this approach. The court’s argument for increase:
the delay “increase[es] the penalty imposed for the commission
275
of capital crimes.” The court’s argument for decrease: the delay “has already reduced the full retributive function of execution, and indefinitely rendered [the defendant’s] status more
276
like that of a life prisoner.”
Under this fourth possible approach, substantial DRI is
both an additional punishment of one type—incarceration—and
a mitigation of another type—capital punishment. With each
year on death row, the prisoner suffers an additional year of incarceration but “enjoys” an additional year of life (thereby de273. Construing substantial DRI as either additional punishment or a mitigation of capital punishment may also yield an absurdity. See infra Part III.E
and note 295.
274. 28 P.3d 78, 114–15 (Cal. 2001) (denying Lackey claim because the delay does not frustrate the deterrent and retributive goals of punishment).
275. Id. at 115.
276. Id.
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creasing the severity of execution). One might be tempted to
conclude the net effect is necessarily a wash. The decrease in
capital punishment offsets the increase of incarceral punishment. The disproportionally lenient component offsets the disproportionally excessive component. But only if capital and
incarceral punishment are the same type of punishment would
the net effect be necessarily a wash.
As obviously different types of punishment, the net result
may not be a wash. As Justice Stewart explained, “[t]he penalty
of death differs from all other forms of criminal punishment,
277
not in degree but in kind.” That is, the difference is not merely quantitative: “the penalty of death is qualitatively different
from a sentence of imprisonment, however long. Death, in its
finality, differs more from life imprisonment than a 100-year
278
prison term differs from one of only a year or two.”
Because capital and incarceral punishment are qualitatively different, there are three possible net effects. First, for each
additional year on death row, the increase in incarceral punishment substantially exceeds the decrease in capital punishment. If so, the Combination is disproportionally excessive. Second, the increase in incarceral punishment is substantially
less than the decrease in capital punishment. If so, the Combination is disproportionally lenient. Third, the increase in
incarceral punishment is roughly equivalent to the decrease in
capital punishment. If so, the punitive value of the Combination would be roughly equivalent to capital punishment alone.
Under the first two possible net effects, the Combination violates retributivism. Only under the third possible net effect
might the Combination satisfy retributivism.
So which is the correct net effect? The correct net effect
may be indeterminate. Comparing the punitive value of additional years of incarceration with the mitigating value of additional years of life is incommensurate. There is no obvious conversion rate between the two different types of punishment. It
is perhaps apples and oranges. Both because of and despite this
indeterminacy, retributivism fails to justify the Combination.
Because the correct net effect is indeterminate, whether retributivism justifies the Combination is indeterminate. But
punishment requires affirmative justification; lacking an affirmative justification the imposition of punishment is unjusti277. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 306 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring).
278. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976).

